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This thesis examines two crucial periods in the history of U.S.-Pakistan 
relations and how American policy makers’ strategic thinking about Pakistan 
shaped the course of relations. Following the Korean War and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, the United States invested heavily in the military forces of 
Pakistan. During both periods, it was widely held that the Soviet Union 
endeavored to threaten the Middle East and gain an outlet onto Indian Ocean. 
American planners believed that because of Pakistan’s strategic location, it would 
be essential to preventing Soviet expansion in the region. In many ways, U.S. 
thinking in both periods closely resembled British thinking about South and 
Central Asia during the 19th and early 20th century. It was believed that Tsarist 
Russia sought to threaten British India as well as acquire warm-water ports on the 
Indian Ocean. Dubbed “The Great Game,” this interpretation of Russia and South 
Asia and its impact on American thinking in the region will also be discussed. 
This history of U.S.-Pakistan relations focuses primarily on the 
perspective of U.S. policy makers and thus most of the research is based on 
official documents of the U.S. Department of State and other government 
agencies. Much of this research was completed at the National Archives in 
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From the birth of Pakistan in 1947, the relationship between the United 
States and Pakistan has been governed almost entirely by U.S. security interests. 
For most of the decades after WWII, the primary security interest of the Unites 
States was in preventing the expansion of Soviet spheres of influence throughout 
the globe. When American planners believed that it was in the best interests of the 
U.S. to project its military and political influence through Pakistan to the 
supposed detriment of Soviet interests, the relationship was a close one. But, 
when Pakistan did not appear to be useful to this end, the relationship ranged from 
effectively non-existent to hostile. 
Beginning in 1954, Dwight Eisenhower transformed Pakistan into the base 
of U.S. influence in South Asia, and to a lesser extent, the Middle East. Pakistan 
was to become a regional military force heavily subsidized with U.S. dollars. 
However, less than 10 years later, John Kennedy considered allowing Pakistan to 
drift from U.S. orbit and asked, “What do we get from Pakistan?  In return for the 
protection of our alliance and our assistance what do they do for us?”1 Kennedy 
had long favored a South Asia policy of strengthening India instead. Given the 
crushing defeat China dealt India in the fall of 1962, and the expectation that 
China would try to finish the job, Kennedy no doubt believed that improving 
relations with the larger and more prosperous nation of India was well worth the 
                                                 
1 “Memorandum of Conversation, December 20, 1962” FRUS,1961-1963, Volume XIX, pg. 455-
456 
 
loss of Pakistan. During the Nixon administration the U.S. once again developed 
close relations with Pakistan. Though this period was not marked by any formal 
agreement between the governments, U.S. policy was to “tilt” toward Pakistan. 
This improvement in relations would, in part, facilitate the opening of formal 
relations between the U.S. and China this “tilt” would not prevent Pakistan from 
being humiliated in a war with India in 1971 nor would it prevent East Pakistan 
from becoming the independent state of Bangladesh. Throughout the 1970’s U.S.-
Pakistan relations deteriorated and reached their nadir following the destruction of 
the American Embassy in Pakistan in November of 1979. However, following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, relations between the U.S. and 
Pakistan improved dramatically. The United States took a renewed interest in 
Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and once again Pakistan became a 
major recipient of U.S. military aid. At the beginning of the present decade 
Pakistan went from being perceived by many American policy makers as a 
reckless incipient nuclear power, to an invaluable ally in the War on Terror 
following September 11, 2001. In short, the history of U.S.-Pakistani relations has 
been marked by rapid swings. Depending on the situation, the U.S. has ignored, 
lauded, condemned, or courted Pakistan. How does one explain this history and 
what can it tell us about future relations with Pakistan? 
Though this thesis will focus primarily on America’s relations with 
Pakistan, in many ways, U.S. decisions to arm Pakistan were the extension of 
years of speculation on the strategic importance of northwestern India. Since the 




threatened British interests in Central and South Asia, geopolitical thinkers 
speculated on the best means of regional defense for India and later of the Indian 
Ocean littoral. Most agreed that firm control of Northwestern India was essential 
to defending India and limiting Russian expansion. In the 1940’s, men like Olaf 
Caroe and K.M. Panikkar wrote along similar lines with the major difference 
being that they added to the debate the implications of an independent South Asia, 
and at least in Caroe’s case, Partition as well. Though he believed that Partition 
had weakened the defensive capabilities of India, he concluded that a strong 
Pakistani military could protect the Subcontinent, as well as the Persian Gulf, 
from Soviet expansion.  
Despite Caroe’s advice, following the division of British India into 
Pakistan and India, the United States believed its interests would be better served 
by a strong India. Pakistan was an afterthought.  This began to change following 
the outbreak of the Korean War. To begin with, American officials became 
convinced that the Soviet Union had initiated the hostilities and the U.S. should 
thus prepare for Soviet incursions elsewhere. Many officials believed that the 
Persian Gulf and South Asia were two regions vulnerable to Soviet attack. While 
India would have been a natural choice for the defense of the Gulf and the 
Subcontinent, American officials found India’s commitment to non-alignment 
frustrating. In addition, Pakistani officials actively promoted their country as 
staunchly anti-communist and more than willing to accept U.S. military aid. 
Coupled with the belief of some U.S. military and diplomatic officials that 




military force, Pakistan became the focus of U.S. policy in South Asia. In addition 
to ideas concerning Pakistan specifically, a third factor was a U.S. plan to contain 
Soviet expansion by creating a chain of U.S.-armed allies along the southern 
border of the Soviet Union. Combined, these factors led to a formal alliance 
between the U.S. and Pakistan in 1954. 
Following the deterioration of the alliance in the 1960’s and the brief 
warming of relations during the Nixon administration, Pakistan remained on the 
periphery of U.S. strategic interests. In fact, for much of the Carter administration, 
Pakistan was a source of a frustration. The United States was dismayed by both 
the instability of Pakistan’s government and its efforts to build a nuclear weapon. 
In November of 1979, in the midst of series of setbacks for the U.S. in the Muslim 
world, the American Embassy in Pakistan was completely destroyed by an angry 
mob and two U.S. servicemen were killed. Many American officials were under-
whelmed by the response of the Pakistani government and relations were perhaps 
at an all-time low. 
 The situation would change dramatically in a little over a month. On 
Christmas Eve 1979 the Soviet Union conducted a large-scale invasion of 
Afghanistan, Pakistan’s northern neighbor. Overnight, Pakistan became a chief 
concern of U.S. policy makers, though there was debate about what exactly the 
Soviets wanted. Some claimed that the invasion was a Soviet move to threaten the 
Persian Gulf and much of the world’s oil supply while others claimed that it was 
part of a historic Russian effort to obtain access to warm water ports on the Indian 




combination of both. A fourth, much less prominent explanation held that the 
Soviets were concerned that Afghanistan would destabilize the mostly Muslim 
states in Soviet Central Asia and the invasion was an attempt to rein in 
Afghanistan.  
Ideas concerning Pakistan and the U.S. response also varied. Some 
claimed that Pakistan needed U.S. arms to prevent further Soviet expansion. 
Others claimed Pakistan would “acquiesce” to Soviet pressure and somehow 
become a Soviet satellite without firm U.S. support. A third, and again, much less 
prominent line of reasoning held that the U.S. should support Pakistan in order to 
funnel U.S. aid to the Afghan insurgents. By late 1982 the United States would 
spend $600 million a year on military and economic aid to Pakistan. Only Israel, 
Egypt, and Turkey received more assistance.2  
While the situations precipitating the U.S. decisions were very different, 
the logic behind them was similar. In both the mid-1950’s and the early 1980’s, 
U.S. military planners believed that Pakistan’s geographic location merited 
military aid far out of proportion to its overall political and economic importance. 
This thesis seeks to explore the logic behind these decisions in greater detail and 
to determine to what extent the U.S. received a return on its investment in 
Pakistan.             
 This study begins with a brief look at the history of strategic thinking 
about South Asia that began in the late-19th century and continued to be a topic of 
debate through the independence of India and Partition. There follows a chapter 
                                                 
2 Dennis Kux. The United States and Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies, 1947-2000, (Baltimore: Johns 




examining the early history of U.S.-Pakistani relations that culminated in the 
alliance of 1954. This chapter focuses primarily on official documents and 
publications of the U.S. government, as well as articles on the subject in the 
American media. A third chapter examines the alliance of the 1980’s. It will also 
rely primarily on government sources though it should be noted that many 
relevant documents are not yet declassified. The concluding chapter will look at 
the periods together, discuss the similarities and differences between these two 








The Great Game 
 
The strategic value accorded Pakistan is almost entirely because of its 
geographic location. Pakistan has been considered valuable not only to defending 
the Indian Subcontinent but also to controlling the Indian Ocean and defending 
the Persian Gulf. In the first two cases, one possible source of influence may be 
the so-called “Great Game” between the British and Russian empires.  In the most 
popular terms, the British and Russians saw themselves as rival, global powers 
and many Britons were convinced that Tsarist Russia desired both a warm water 
port on the Indian Ocean and a means to threaten British India. Several historians 
claim that an invasion of India was actually attempted by Russian Tsar Paul I in 
1801. According to Peter Hopkirk’s account, a force of more than 20,000 
Cossacks left the city of Orenburg in February of 1801. Apparently, this quixotic 
and half-hearted adventure got as far as the Aral Sea, roughly a thousand miles 
short of the Khyber Pass, and after Paul was murdered Alexander I recalled the 
troops.3 Any long-term plans would have required expanding Russian influence 
into Central Asia, traversing the Western Himalayas in present-day Afghanistan, 
and gaining the cooperation of the tribes who controlled the mountains. These 
things would have been difficult in and of themselves but certain Britons believed 
that following this, the Russians would attempt to invade or at least threaten 
                                                 
3 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game, (New York: Kodansha International, 1990) 26-30 and J.A. 
Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India, from Stalin to Brezhnev, (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970) 3-4 
Though several historians believe the invasion was actually attempted, the story may be 




British India by developing naval bases from which to mount major military 
operations. Despite the manifold reasons why the Russian empire would not have 
pursued such ends, it is believed that the British sought to gain the allegiance of 
the tribes who inhabited the regions northwest of India and, with their help, short-
circuit Russian plans. Apparently, a contest developed between small numbers of 
Russian and British agents in the mountains of what is now Afghanistan. This 
version of the Great Game placed a heavy emphasis on far-reaching intrigues, 
disguises, and dramatic showdowns. The classic portrayal of these operations is 
found in Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (1901). However interesting the possibility of 
such intrigue may be, it is doubtful that the Great Game unfolded in such dramatic 
fashion. In fact, the entire concept itself may have greater root in the British 
imagination than in the rugged passes of the Hindu Kush. Naik cites several 
British historians who claim that the Tsarist government never took military 
operations against India seriously.4 Gerlad Morgan’s “Myth and Reality in the 
Great Game” approached the subject by examining various departments of the Raj 
to determine if there ever existed a British intelligence network in Central Asia. 
Morgan insisted that evidence of such a network does not exist. At best, efforts to 
obtain information on Russian moves in Central Asia were rare, ad hoc 
adventures. At worst, intrigues resembling the adventures in Kim were baseless 
rumors and Morgan claims such rumors “were always common currency in 
Central Asia and they applied as much to Russia as to Britain.”5   
                                                 
4 Naik, 5-6. 
 





Malcolm Yapp’s lecture, “The Legend of the Great Game” offers 
additional evidence that the popular understanding of Anglo-Russian relations 
over Central Asia in the 19th century is seriously flawed. Yapp points out that 
Britons had used the term “The Great Game” in the late 1800’s to describe several 
different things in relation to its interests in Asia.6 In addition, the meaning of 
“The Great Game” that is popular now does not reflect the real concerns of the 
British in relation to India in the 19th century. Yapp believes that the primary 
concern of British authorities in India was control of the indigenous population, 
not preventing a Russian invasion. But however spurious the assumptions 
regarding the Anglo-Russian rivalry of the 19th and early 20th centuries, they are 
no less compelling. According to Yapp, “reading the history of the British Empire 
in India and the Middle East one is struck by both the prominence and the 
unreality of strategic debates.” And the prominence of the debates serves to 
obscure the real challenge the British faced in India which was their internal 
control, not the external threats from the far side of the Himalayas. 7 While the 
situation of the U.S. in the South Asia during the Cold War would be quite 
different, it will be shown that the U.S. also concerned itself more with the threat 
of external Soviet influence and/or action in the region than with the internal 
challenges to the newly independent nations, particularly in the case of Pakistan.  
 As mentioned earlier, many discussions of the Great Game assume that, in 
addition to threatening India through overland operations, Tsarist Russia coveted 
                                                                                                                                     
 







ports on the Indian Ocean. In some ways the latter fear would become  part of a 
separate strain of Anglo-American Russo-phobia relating to warm-water ports in 
general. William Green of Boston University and the U.S. Naval Reserves claims 
that the Russian desire for warm-water ports is a geopolitical myth. As far as 
South Asia is concerned, the myth apparently has its origins in both the real 
expansions of Russian economic and political influence in Central Asia during the 
late 19th century and the British concerns with instability in India. Green, like 
Yapp, believes that the British misplaced their concerns, focusing on the potential 
threat of Russia and ignoring the real threat of Indian uprisings. Also contributing 
to the life of this myth was the sensational forgery titled “The Testament of Peter 
the Great.” The testament is a list of precepts that would supposedly lead to 
Russian world domination. It includes, among other things, a command to 
“progress as much as possible in the direction of Constantinople and India. He 
who can gain possession of these points is the real ruler of the world… and force 
our way into India which is the treasure house of the world; once there, we can 
dispense with English gold.” First appearing around the time of Napoleon and 
most likely a piece of French propaganda, it was found useful by British 
journalists in the late-19th century, the Nazis, and Western journalists in the 
1980’s to explain Russian foreign policy.  
Even though most writers acknowledged that the document was a forgery, 
they usually insisted that Russian policies were still consistent with the basic 
ideas. Green believes that the document influenced general and geopolitical 




developed several maps that portrayed the “natural” geopolitical boundaries of the 
world in which the Soviet Union had maritime access to the Arabian Sea and 
often his ‘Greater Soviet Union’ even incorporated all of India. During the early 
stages of WWII, Germany, believing strongly in the warm-water/Indian ocean 
thesis, offered the Soviets “direct access to the Persian Gulf.” The Soviets 
declined the offer because, according to Green, they had naturally greater 
strategic interests in Eastern Europe.8 This would not be the first or the last time 
that Russian/Soviets would not act in accordance with their rivals’ specious 
assumptions.  
 As both WWII and British control of India were coming to an end around 
the same time, Indian-born and Oxford-educated Kavalam Madhava Panikkar 
wrote on the security of the Indian Ocean in light of the waning strength of Great 
Britain, the persistence of Russian interests, and the independence of India.9 In an 
article for Pacific Affairs in 1945 titled “Regional Organization for the Indian 
Ocean Area,” Panikkar claimed the Indian Ocean had been a “British lake” and 
the security of the region had been a matter of British naval power based in India. 
But as Britain gave up control of India and the Soviet Union sought an outlet into 
the Indian Ocean, Panikkar believed that a policy of cooperation among all of the 
new nations of the Indian Ocean littoral would be crucial, not only to peace in the 
region but world peace as well. The centerpiece of this regional approach would 
be India as it “alone can provide air and naval bases capable of undertaking the 
                                                 
8 William Green, “The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port; Anatomy of a Geopolitical 
Myth,” Naval War College Review, vol. 46, no. 2 (1993) 80-102 
  




defense” of the Indian Ocean.10 In his article in International Affairs in 1946 “The 
Defence of India and Indo-British Obligations,” Panikkar addressed the place of 
an independent India and “the future peace in Asia and perhaps the whole world.” 
Panikkar reiterated his earlier claim of India’s unique position as a potential base 
of defense for the entire Indian Ocean region but with much greater emphasis on 
the necessity of Britain to help develop that potential. Panikkar also discussed 
India’s interest in the security of the Persian Gulf and the stability of nations that 
bordered then British India including Persia and Afghanistan, the latter of which 
Panikkar would later call “India’s historical ‘half-way house for invaders’ from 
Central Asia.”11 Panikkar also asserted that Russian interests in Persia and 
Afghanistan and elsewhere on India’s fringes would be irreconcilable with the 
interests of India “at least for a very considerable time.”12 
Panikkar expanded on the subject of the interconnected security of the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in his book India and the Indian Ocean: An 
Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History published in 1945. Among 
Panikkar’s many concerns was the importance of the Persian Gulf to the Soviet 
Union in WWII, apparently “a lesson not likely to be forgotten,” (but the reader is 
not told by whom) and the “unprecedented development of Central Asia” by the 
U.S.S.R. which Panikkar believes “will demand an outlet into the sea.” 
Apparently, this would then lead to a revolution in Soviet geopolitical strategy 
                                                 
10 K.M. Panikkar, “Regional Organization for the Indian Ocean Area,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 18, no. 
3 (September 1945) 246-251. 
 
11 K.M. Panikkar, “The Defence of India and Indo-British Obligations,” International Affairs, vol. 
22, no. 1 (January 1946) 85-90 and Brobst, 47. 
 




with respect to the Indian Ocean and could evolve into a significant threat to the 
Subcontinent. The reader learns that “a strong military state on the Persian Gulf,” 
given “the growth of the power of shore defenses [and] the effectiveness of the 
attack of land-based planes” could project its strength out to the sea as well as 
construct “an impregnable base and resist successfully all attacks from the sea.” If 
this power could then maintain a large and powerful navy “then the Persian Gulf 
could become what Scapa Flow is to the Atlantic and Wilhelmshaven to the 
Baltic.” Accordingly, this was a problem of the utmost importance for the future 
of India.13 While no such situation would develop to threaten South Asia, 
Panikkar represented yet another strain of thinking in a tradition that dealt with 
South Asian security by assuming that Russia had both the impulse and the means 
to project its influence into this theatre.                
 At the same time that Panikkar published his ideas on the future of South 
Asia and the Middle East, Sir Olaf Caroe also wrote extensively on the subject. 
As a veteran of the British Imperial government in India, fluent in both Urdu and 
Pashto, one time governor of the North-West Frontier Province, and having 
frequently written articles in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society and 
the journal Round Table, Caroe was one of the highest-ranking and most 
knowledgeable contributors to the subject of geopolitical strategy in South Asia. 
The main thrust of Caroe’s work was that the Great Game between the Russian 
and British Empires would continue but with a change in players and a slight shift 
in geographic focus. Caroe claimed that an independent India, and later Pakistan 
                                                 
13 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian 




after Partition, would be essential to checking traditional Russian designs on 
South and Central Asia as well as Russian interest in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. 
Caroe appears to have been one of the first advocates of Pakistan’s strategic value 
and his ideas resembled the eventual U.S. policy. For Peter John Brobst, however, 
the similarities are coincidental. Brobst asserts that Caroe did not have a 
significant impact on the initial U.S. approach to South Asia. He makes this claim 
based on the fact that Caroe advocated an approach that placed the Indian 
subcontinent at the strategic center of post-war geopolitics. However, U.S. policy 
makers in the early years of the Cold War placed India and Pakistan on the 
strategic periphery.14 The overall scheme aside, Brobst does point out Caroe’s 
belief that Pakistan would be essential to defending both the Indian Subcontinent 
and the Persian Gulf from the Soviet Union. In Caroe’s book Wells of Power, a 
geopolitical piece on the security of the Persian Gulf oil fields, he asserted that for 
the nations of the Gulf, “life and security are bound up with the destiny of the 
territories around them, curving in an arc from Arabia in the west, round the 
Fertile Crescent, through Persia and Afghanistan to Pakistan.” In a chapter 
devoted to a plan of defending the Gulf by building a string of airbases along this 
arc, Caroe identified “the main base area of defense” as Egypt, but such an arc 
“which fails to embrace Pakistan is incomplete.” 15 Caroe also made much of the 
leadership potential of Pakistan. Particularly in relations with Afghanistan and 
Persia, both of which “feel acutely the imminence of Russia,” Pakistan would 
enjoy the “the natural bonds of Islam.” In addition, Pakistan had inherited “a 
                                                 
14 Brobst, xix  
 




government and an administration based on Western liberal ideas’ with which she 
might “animate the Muslim world” and at the same time claim membership in the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Caroe hoped that Pakistan would inspire “a conscious 
policy for securing the immense resources around the Persian Gulf, and for 
establishing a group of Welfare States to combat Communism in South-Western 
Asia.”16  
 Much of the U.S. logic in its alliance with Pakistan was based on the 
potential of the young, impoverished nation to take a prominent leadership role in 
the Muslim world as well as form the eastern flank of a defensive perimeter along 
the Soviet Union’s southern border. Brobst, however, goes to great lengths to 
explain the differences between Caroe’s ideas and those of U.S. planners and why 
Caroe did not influence U.S. opinion. For the most part, his explanation is 
convincing. What does this mean for scholarship on the U.S.-Pakistani alliance? 
Should Panikkar and Caroe be dismissed as geopolitical futurologists whose 
projections did not come to pass for any number of reasons? On the other hand 
Caroe and Panikkar make it clear that U.S. thinking did not take place in a 
vacuum. U.S. policy makers were another generation in a line of strategists 
wrestling with the problems of stabilizing South and Southwestern Asia vis-à-vis 
an ambitious and southward-looking Russia. Their ideas represent useful contrasts 
to the eventual policies of the United States in the region. This is particularly 
important given the scholarly consensus that American policies in Pakistan have 
failed to produce stability in the region. In the opinion of most South Asia 
scholars this is especially true in the case of Pakistan, which has, in many ways, 
                                                 




been a source of instability in South Asia. To determine the extent of American 
responsibility in the failure of its Pakistan policies one must start at the beginning 









U.S.-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1954 
 
The First Phase 
Given the terms of Partition, Pakistan was an incredibly weak nation. While it 
was a relatively large country in both population and landmass, it was divided into 
two wings, separated by over a thousand miles and a hostile power in India. The 
terms of the Partition also left Pakistan economically weak, as it inherited only 
10% of British India’s industrial base and 17.5% of its financial assets.17 In terms 
of leadership it is was also misshapen, as 55% of the population lived in East 
Pakistan, what is now Bangladesh, yet West Pakistanis dominated the government 
and the military.18 Culturally there was little on which to build a Pakistani identity 
as several different languages were spoken and several distinct cultural identities 
asserted themselves long after independence. Pakistan also failed to obtain 
complete control over the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir in 1948. The ensuing 
contest with India over the state demanded much of Pakistan’s political and 
military energy and does so even today. Psychologically, Pakistanis were also 
distracted by fears that India would attempt to “reunite” the subcontinent and 
extend the rule of the Hindu majority over South Asian Muslims. Given these 
17 
 
                                                 
17 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History. (London: Hurst and Company, 1998) 95-99 and 
Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 49-56 
 
 
18 Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 383. 
 
manifold weaknesses, why, then, did the United States come to favor Pakistan 
over India? 
 This chapter will examine the first years of U.S. relations with the 
independent nations of South Asia. Consistent with the rhetoric of Pannikar, 
Caroe, and others, U.S. policy was constructed around maintaining the unity of 
the region. This is particularly evident in the U.S. response to the Kashmir 
dispute. But at the same time, if there was a preference for either India or Pakistan 
in these first years, American policy makers clearly favored India. Not only was 
India larger, more populous, and relatively more prosperous, but also Pakistan 
was, as indicated above, incredibly weak. This is not to say that no one 
appreciated Pakistan’s potential. While the U.S. accorded India greater overall 
importance, there were those who believed that Pakistan had more to offer in 
military terms. Conversely however, there were those who believed Pakistan was 
a weak link in the security of South Asia. Nonetheless, the prevailing view among 
U.S. policy makers was that Pakistan’s weak geographic position made it a poor 
potential ally. The fundamental feature of American policy in the region was a 
conviction that South Asia was low on the list of strategic priorities.    
 Robert McMahon’s The Cold War on the Periphery makes it clear that, at 
least initially, U.S. policy makers did not favor either nation. The very concept of 
Pakistan had not been around for very long and only in the 1940’s had the idea 
gained significant popularity. Thus most British officials and their American 
counterparts thought of the subcontinent in unitary terms. Even after Partition, 




was believed that favoring one particular nation would only multiply the existing 
intraregional disputes. This balanced approach was also expected to help resolve 
these same disputes. It was believed that if tensions could be resolved, greater 
cooperation between India and Pakistan would be possible on several levels, not 
the least of which would be defense.19   
This balancing act aside, McMahon identifies a dichotomy in U.S. policies 
on the region, which, on the one hand, accorded Pakistan strategic value, but 
believed India had greater political and economic potential.20 Prior to the 
Partition, George Marshall and Asaf Ali, then Indian Ambassador to the U.S., 
discussed India’s role in the Second World War as the arsenal of the China-
Burma-India Theatre. Ali claimed that if India had been properly prepared, the 
war would have been shortened by at least two years. The Ambassador claimed 
that the political and economic development of India would also enable it to be “a 
bastion for the world against the great northern neighbor which now cast its 
shadow over two continents.”21 This was probably one of the earliest in a series of 
signals from Indian officials that touted the potential of India to the U.S. 
Corollary to these signals were messages that began to appear in 1948  
proclaiming India’s commitment to democracy and alignment with the West. 
Girja Shanker Bajpai, then Secretary General of Indian External Affairs, told the 
head of Near Eastern Affairs for the U.S. State Department, Loy Henderson, that 
                                                 
19 Robert J. McMahon The Cold War on the Periphery, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994) 12 
 
20 Ibid. 11 
 




“should the world once again become involved in conflict, India could only 
associate itself with those nations holding the same ideals of freedom and 
democracy.” Apparently, the only things keeping India from declaring this 
publicly were that India “could not withstand the aggression from Russia or the 
internal difficulties which might ensue.” It is not clear if Bajpai believed these 
“internal difficulties” would be the result of Indian Communists’ reactions or 
some other form of anti-Western activity. Later in the conversation Henderson 
shared what he believed to be the prevailing opinion of the State Department 
concerning India stating that “long term close and friendly relations between India 
and the United States was the anchor of stability of the whole area from Africa to 
South East Asia.” 22  
The U.S. preference for India was so acute that the American General 
Consul in Pakistan wrote in 1948 that Washington’s policy towards Pakistan was 
wholly inadequate. Although Muslims might be “retrograde, uninformed, [and] 
venal” and an accident of geography had made them vital to U.S. interests, 
Pakistan’s leaders were far more acceptable than “the torturous Hindu who 
despises as he grovels before, or politely infuriates by obfuscation the unclean 
European.” The Consul recognized that backing Pakistan overtly would 
compromise the U.S. standing with “the far greater and richer India…but… so 
what?”23 This of course represented the minority view of the situation particularly 
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following the first successful test of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the 
Communist conquest of the Chinese mainland. H.W. Brands believes that these 
events conspired to confer greater importance on the visit of Jawaharlal Nehru to 
the United States in the autumn of 1949. According to Brands “American 
legislators hailed the arrival of the great man… [and] American pundits praised 
the pandit as Asia’s new savior.”24 Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee 
argued in November 1949 that “in all of Asia [India] is now the only nation that is 
large enough and has the power potential to resist determined Communist military 
effort with any possibility of success… If we are to have an effective policy in 
Asia… India must be the keystone of that policy.”25  Though the trip would 
actually do more to damage American-Indian relations, an influential group of 
American lawmakers would continue to tout the importance of India, including 
Hubert Humphrey and John F. Kennedy. 
India was also preferred because of the relative weakness of the Pakistani 
military. While there existed generalizations about the “martial traditions” of the 
ethnic groups that constituted much of Pakistan, in reality Pakistan was seen as a 
military liability to the defense of South Asia. In 1948 a State Department 
document addressed “The Russian Menace to India.” India’s northwestern frontier 
was a potential “trouble-spot,” because of Partition and “the resultant military 
weakness of Pakistan.”26 Ayesha Jalal’s research on the development of the 
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Pakistani military establishment also adds an interesting dimension to the strategic 
value of Pakistan. According to Jalal, British military planners in 1946 painted a 
grim picture of Pakistan’s defense potential both in strategic terms and in regard 
to the development of military resources. Pakistan’s two wings, West and East, 
constituted the two main land frontiers of British India. Though some envisioned 
Pakistan as a future bulwark against Soviet threats to both South Asia and the 
Persian Gulf, in the immediate aftermath of Partition, Pakistan was strategically 
exposed by its very make-up. British officials estimated that “to defend itself, 
Pakistan would have to maintain an army and an air force approximately the same 
size required to defend the whole of India.” None of the necessary industrial or 
military installations created by the British lay in what constituted Pakistan nor 
did Pakistan possess the resources for their construction.27  
The idea that Pakistan’s geographic position was a weakness as much as it 
was a strength is evident in a State Department document from 1948. According 
to the paper “the geographic position of Pakistan places her in a difficult military 
position.” Among other things, the defense of the North-West Frontier Province is 
“aggravated by the presence within this area of thousands of nomadic tribesmen.” 
Perhaps echoing the basic tenets of the Great Game, the paper goes on to describe 
“invasions into the Indian subcontinent” having swept through this area and “new 
invasions… particularly any by Russia, would inevitably follow this route.” 
Accordingly, “the brunt of the defense therefore, of the Indian subcontinent would 
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be Pakistan’s,” a Pakistan that at the time was believed to be “extremely weak” 
militarily. However, in the same document, there are highly optimistic statements 
about Pakistan. The young nation was described as “potentially a formidable 
military power” and among its strengths: a large population and a highly 
organized Defense Ministry. The author then speculates on likely boons to the 
“potential strike force” of Pakistan. Among them are Pakistan gaining military 
assistance from Great Britain or from other Islamic nations and oil being 
discovered in Balochistan.28 The sentiment in this document seems to indicate a 
dichotomy in U.S. thinking in which Pakistan’s geographic position is both an 
asset and a weakness. Further evidence of this appears in a memo of the State, 
Army, Navy, and Air Force Coordinating Committee from May of 1948. On the 
subject of sharing information classified as “restricted” with Pakistan, the author 
notes “it is understood the United States Army is particularly interested in 
cultivating friendship and cooperation of Pakistan [and] this cooperation may be 
more easily obtained if it is possible to make restricted information available to 
Pakistan.”29 It is not clear from the document why the U.S. Army had particular 
interests in developing American-Pakistani cooperation but it is very likely that 
the Army shared the view that Pakistan could become a military asset to the 
United States.      
 Regardless of whether Pakistan constituted a “trouble-spot” or a valuable 
strike force at some future date, the most significant factor affecting the U.S. view 
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of Pakistan was that South Asia did not represent a major priority for America’s 
newly-minted cold warriors. As discussed earlier, Loy Henderson did assure Girja 
Bajpai in April of 1948 that close relations between India and the U.S. would 
benefit the Indian Ocean area, but in the next breath he informed Bajpai that 
“unfortunately, at the moment the United States has found it necessary to 
concentrate its efforts and resources on resisting aggression in certain other parts 
of the world.”30 The clearest demonstration of this sentiment came in the form of 
the U.S. arms embargo placed on both India and Pakistan following their first 
armed conflict over Kashmir. 
Though overwhelmingly Muslim in population, Kashmir had been given 
to Hindu Rajputs in the 19th century by the British and the state continued to be 
under Hindu control even after the formal independence of Pakistan and India. 
Since not formally ruled by the British, the princely state could have maintained 
its independence and there were movements within Kashmir that advocated as 
much. However, both India and Pakistan had supporters in Kashmir who worked 
for the state’s accession to one or the other. As the dispute between India and 
Pakistan grew from skirmishes inside Kashmir into what could be called an actual 
war, both nations attempted to purchase arms and ammunition from the United 
States. On March 12, 1948 however, President Truman approved a 
recommendation by George Marshall that the United States not issue licenses “for 
the export of military material for either India or Pakistan.”31 Following this, the 
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primary goal of U.S. policy in the region became to “prevent any increase in the 
military potential of either [Pakistan or India].”32 This of course resulted in 
lobbying by representatives from both countries who argued that their situations, 
for various reasons, required the U.S. embargo be compromised somewhat. 
However, the United States did not formally lift the ban until India and Pakistan 
agreed to a cease-fire in January of 1949. Regardless of Pakistan and/or India’s 
potential as military assets for the United States or the potential danger to South 
Asia posed by the Soviet Union, when it came to substantial action, the United 
States believed its interests could be better served by limiting the military 
potential of both nations.   
Pakistan’s Early Boosters 
It is not clear if Pakistani leaders knew that their nation was low on the list 
of American strategic priorities. It is clear, however, that this leadership 
recognized the dire circumstances facing Pakistan, and this in turn led them seek 
help beyond their borders. In the pursuit of aid, both economic and military, 
Pakistani officials often emphasized two qualities: the strategic value of Pakistan 
to the United States and Pakistan’s firm orientation away from the U.S.S.R. and 
communism in general. 
 The Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, M.A.H. Ispahani, wrote to 
Secretary of State George Marshall in October of 1948 detailing the difficulties 
facing the Pakistani military and in particular the specific shortages faced by the 
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armed forces. The ambassador also advertised Pakistan’s usefulness to the U.S. 
claiming that “in a period of emergency, Pakistan can form a base for both 
military and air operations,” and Pakistanis “remain well-equipped and strong, 
ready to meet any emergency that the international situation may hurl upon the 
world.” Ispahani also reminded Marshall of Pakistan’s “extensive strategic 
frontiers” which demand “adequate border patrols for their defense.” In addition 
to defending Pakistan’s borders, “the preservation of internal security- law and 
order” also required “a well-trained and equipped army” since “certain ideological 
and political trends have recently shown themselves more and more clearly in 
lands like Indonesia, Malay [sic], Burma and even India.” While recognizing that 
“this ideology,” which one could safely assume was Communism, was “foreign to 
Islam and it [was] not acceptable Moslems, it nevertheless becomes necessary to 
guard against its inroads into Pakistan.”33 While Ispahani accurately described the 
situation facing Pakistan and, possibly, its importance to the U.S., his letter 
greatly exaggerated Pakistan’s military capabilities at the time. Pakistan did not 
need U.S. aid to “remain” well-equipped and ready to meet “any emergency.” 
Indeed, by all indications the Pakistani armed forces were inadequately equipped 
to offer much more than token resistance to a determined invasion or token 
support to forces elsewhere. In general, U.S. policy makers believed that the 
military forces of the South Asian countries were “barely sufficient to meet 
existing demands for the maintenance of internal security.” In addition, it was 
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believed that the South Asian nations would not “for the foreseeable future 
effectively resist a full-scale invasion by the U.S.S.R.”34           
 In March, Pakistan’s foreign minister Zafrullah Khan met with American 
officials in New York to discuss the Kashmir dispute. Among his arguments for 
Pakistan’s position on the embattled princely state was that if the people of 
Pakistan did not receive satisfaction this would constitute a serious danger to 
India “because Pakistan essentially was the only protection of India from the 
Northwest– meaning the Russians.” Khan followed this with a statement on 
Pakistan’s position regarding the U.S.S.R.. According to Khan “Pakistan was not 
sympathetic with Communism and… their position was taken in the event of any 
major struggle.” But he wondered aloud whether, if the Kashmir dispute was 
resolved unfairly, would the people of Pakistan “have any heart to fight against 
the U.S.S.R.? If the U.S.S.R. cross through the Khyber Pass into Kashmir, the 
Indians would have no defense whatever unless Pakistan was with them.”35 The 
British foreign minister Ernest Bevin shared this view of Kashmir’s importance 
vis-à-vis the Soviets and told Secretary of State Marshall that “the main issue was 
who would control the main artery leading into central Asia” and that should 
India initiate fighting in the coming spring “this might open up considerable 
possibilities to the Russians to exploit the situation in order to gain a foothold in 
Northern India.”36  As for marketing Pakistan’s anti-communist credentials, 
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Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan declared it “unthinkable that Pakistan 
could fall prey to Communism since (1) the latter was contrary [to] tenets of 
Moslem religion in respect [to] democratic ideals, property ownership, and 
individual’s position; (2) states outside the Communist orbit should fully know 
Communist ideology was oppressive in [the] extreme.”37 
In contrast to the notion that Pakistanis were reliable anti-communists, 
Stewart Alsop suggested in a column in The Washington Post that Pakistan could 
be forced into the Soviet orbit fairly easily. According to Alsop, if Soviet-
sponsored proposal in the UN calling for sanctions against Arab states passed, 
several states would have been placed in desperate financial situations. In the case 
of Iraq, Alsop believed that once the sanctions were in place, Iraq would have 
suffered a “violent political explosion” at which point pro-Soviet forces in the 
country would have had an opportunity to gain control. At the same time, the 
Soviet Union would have offered Iraq a loan in exchange for certain concessions, 
concessions that would have “assured effective Soviet political control of Iraq.”  
Alsop believed that Pakistan, “also subject to sanction under the Soviet 
resolution,” would have followed suit, having no choice but to turn “to its 
powerful northern neighbor.”38 Alsop’s reasoning is questionable. It is highly 
unlikely that Pakistan and Iraq would have become Soviet satellites immediately 
after the Soviet Union’s efforts in the UN resulted in their financial ruin.  
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In December of 1949 the State Department addressed the impact of the 
Communist victory in China on Communist activities in South Asia. Apparently 
the Pakistani government was concerned enough about Communist activity to 
declare a state of emergency. The State Department’s view of the situation is not 
clear. A memo cited a “responsible Pakistan Government official” who claimed 
“‘no political significance’ attached to the ordinance, but he added there could be 
no doubt that an emergency existed.”39    
Despite Alsop’s suggestions and the signs of Communist activity in 
Pakistan, General Henry F. Meyers, an American military attaché in Karachi in 
the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, offered a very optimistic and favorable view of 
Pakistan as an ally of the U.S. In his lecture “Soviet Interests in Pakistan and their 
Military Implications” Meyers identified three “premises” of U.S. policy in South 
Asia and highlighted the potential boon to U.S. interests in the region if Pakistan 
were favored over India. Meyers first tackled the assumption that “because of the 
separation of East and West Pakistan, that Pakistan cannot exist.” According to 
Meyers “the Muslims are a close corporation… [and] will fight to the death to 
keep their Islamic principles in this Islamic country which they have now set up 
after years of struggle.” Meyers also believed that telephone and radio links, in 
addition to sea and air routes, enabled East and West Pakistan to remain “closely 
linked” and continue “making headway in solidarity.” Meyers also attacked “the 
idea that India, as an industrial country and because of the loud shouting of their 
leaders, is the bulwark against communism in the Far East.” Here Meyers noted 
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the importance of Karachi to rail and sea traffic in Pakistan as well as the 
determination of Pakistanis to improve their country. Meyers also claimed in 
regard to East Pakistan, “if [Communists] envelope the sub-continent thru 
Burma… they can be stopped here if Pakistan is given any backing.”40 This 
statement is quite misleading as it would require much more than simply “any 
backing” to forestall an action against East Pakistan given that the bulk of the 
nation’s armed forces were located in West Pakistan at the time. According to a 
report from April of 1949, East Pakistan possessed “none of the requisites of 
military strength.”41 Meyers also made much of the “magnificent airfields in 
Pakistan” and their “immense strategic importance for any long-range bombing of 
the U.S.S.R.” Meyers believed that if the U.S. failed to meet Pakistan’s security 
needs and Pakistan retaliated by denying the U.S. use of the bases, “we [would] 
be in a sad way if we suddenly [found] ourselves plunged into war.” On the 
subject of Soviet interests in Pakistan, ostensibly the subject of the lecture, 
Meyers had less to say. Apparently the U.S.S.R. sought to force Pakistan to 
overspend on its defenses while putting  “on a front of friendliness.” Though the 
logic is not entirely clear, Meyers claimed that the military implications of the 
Soviet endeavors were that the Western powers would continue to favor India and 
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lead to Pakistan denying “the use of airfields and bases in Pakistan in war with the 
U.S.S.R.”42 In a statement that may have been a sign of what was to come, 
Meyers claimed, “we feel that Pakistan must be considered as a separate nation 
and oriented toward the Middle East and not toward India and Asia. We feel that 
as Turkey is the Western anchor of the Muslim Bloc, Pakistan is the Eastern 
anchor.” In many ways, Meyers’ vision of Pakistan’s role in a coalition stretching 
from the Mediterranean to the Himalayas is very similar to the role Pakistan 
would play in CENTO, a defensive arrangement Pakistan would join 1955.  
Meyers’ perspective is also significant in that in 1954, he headed the team that 
determined the requirements of Pakistan’s military following the Mutual 
Assistance Agreement signed by the U.S. and Pakistan in May 1954.43     
The second inaugural address of President Truman also began to alter the 
situation in Pakistan’s favor, even though the President did not necessarily take 
the line of Meyers. According to an information memo of the State Department in 
March of 1949, in accordance with the inaugural address, the U.S. would embark 
on a program of military assistance that, instead of merely containing aggression, 
would be a “positive policy for peace.”44 In April, the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Staff developed a paper addressing the military requirements of 
Pakistan. While Meyers seemed more concerned with convincing his listeners that 
Pakistan was a viable ally and that airfields in the country represented a 
                                                 
42 “Soviet Interests in Pakistan and their Military Implications,” undated  
 
43 James W. Spain, “Military Assistance for Pakistan,” The American Political Science Review 
vol. 48, no. 3 (September 1954) 747 
 
44 “Military Assistance, March 11, 1949” Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, RG 59, 




significant strategic prize, this paper addressed specific security problems of 
Pakistan, in particular the problem posed by the U.S.S.R. Apparently, the 
responsibility of meeting a possible Soviet attack “against India and the sub-
continent as a whole” rested on Pakistan, “with or without the help of Afghanistan 
or India.” In addition to shouldering this responsibility, Pakistani leaders were 
also described as giving considerable thought to participating in a “regional 
Middle East or South Asian bloc” as well as desiring to lead “a Muslim bloc” 
themselves.45 
Among the possible implications of the Meyers lecture and the Policy 
Planning paper was that certain U.S. officials had begun to view Pakistan as 
independent of India, at least in terms of defense. As has been shown, British and 
Indian thinkers tended to consider the fate of India and Pakistan inextricably 
linked, particularly in terms of security. According to a report of the British 
military in India prior to the Partition, it was “impossible to consider the strategic 
defense of Pakistan and Hindustan (India) separately.”46     
America’s Official, Strategic View of Pakistan and South Asia 
The most important document of 1949 concerning the relationship 
between Pakistan and the U.S. was a paper produced by the State-Army-Navy-Air 
Force Coordinating Committee. The paper identified the importance of the region 
to U.S. national interests. According to the authors, the region possessed 
economic and military potential but it was not invaluable. If the U.S. were to lose 
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access to the raw materials, manpower, and military bases of the area or if the 
Communists gained control of the area and its vast population, this would 
“gravely affect the security of the U.S.” and adversely affect future U.S. economic 
interests in the region. It was also believed that “any substantial decrease in South 
Asian exports to Europe might have an adverse effect on the European Recovery 
Program.” Compounding these challenges were the recent developments in China, 
which the authors claimed increased the importance of retaining the Indian 
subcontinent as a “Western salient on the Asian continent.” Based on this, 
SANACC listed three strategic objectives of the United States in relation to South 
Asia. The first two were the prevention of Soviet “encroachment or domination” 
of the region and the prevention of the U.S.S.R. from obtaining military support 
from the nations of South Asia “either directly or through the use of their 
facilities.” The third objective was the development of a cooperative attitude in 
the countries of the region that would facilitate Western democracies’ use of areas 
and facilities “for military operations against the U.S.S.R. in the event of war, 
and… the development for operational use” of base facilities in the Karachi-
Lahore area of Pakistan. In particular reference to base facilities, the authors 
believed that as long as Afghanistan’s northern borders remained secure then 
bases in the area could prove “important in conducting air operations against the 
industrial regions of the Soviet Heartland, or in defending Middle East Oil.”47 
Of course a major assumption of SANACC was that the Soviet Union had 
an interest in South Asia and the authors noted that “until very recently… Soviet 
influence was negligible.” This influence apparently increased following the 
                                                 




decline in British control and the Soviets were “at least preparing the way for 
greater Communist activity in South Asia” which included “Soviet 
provocateurs… intermittently active in northern Afghanistan, and agents of the 
Soviet Embassy in Kabul reportedly… in contact with the Afghan tribes of the 
North West Frontier,” at the time a particularly unstable province of Pakistan. The 
paper also addresses the anti-Western propaganda employed by the Soviets in 
South Asia as well as the fact that “no disillusion or suspicion of Communist 
doctrine [had] matured among the people.” This was apparently mitigated by the 
fact that “the traditional religious-social order was antithetical to Communism.”48 
SANACC also addressed the issue of neutrality and South Asia. The 
committee advised that if the U.S. did not commit the minimal amount of 
assistance “deemed essential by the countries of the area, South Asia might give 
effect to its predilection for strict neutrality vis-à-vis the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. or, 
at worst, it might fall into the Soviet orbit.” The paper also claimed that in either 
event, the U.S. should find it difficult to prevent South Asian nations from 
developing outside the U.S. orbit and the U.S. would potentially be denied the 
region’s strategic value. Policy makers’ belief that the neutrality of South Asian 
countries would bring about essentially the same results as if they were to fall into 
Soviet orbit49 would become an important factor in later U.S. policy decisions in 
the region.  
While the Meyers lecture, and to a lesser extent the previously discussed 
Policy Planning Paper on Pakistan written in April 1949, appeared to emphasize 
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Pakistan’s security role apart from the rest of the region, the SANACC committee 
strongly endorsed a regional approach to military assistance. According to their 
report, “we may defeat our own purpose if… we alienate the friendship of one or 
more of the other South Asian powers.” The committee also admitted that if 
assistance was given to one nation, the other nations would increase their pressure 
for comparable aid. However, SANACC also admitted that “India is the natural 
political and economic center of South Asia and aid given to the peripheral 
countries would have to be adapted to the conditions in India.” Although 
obtaining use of facilities in Pakistan specifically was among the four strategic 
objectives of the U.S. in the region, the committee observed that “the effective use 
of the Karachi-Lahore area in Pakistan might well depend upon the access to 
facilities in India as well as Pakistan.” It would seem then that though SANACC 
placed particular value upon Pakistan’s strategic assets, the committee endorsed a 
regional policy in South Asia and admitted to the possibility that Pakistan would 
be useful as long as India remained open to the United States as well.50 
Further comment on Pakistan’s military value to the U.S. came in a memo 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attached to the SANACC paper. The JCS believed 
that, with the exception of Pakistan, the nations of South Asia, under “present and 
prospective conditions” had little value to the U.S. The terrain, the lack of 
communications, and other essentials of modern combat forces would pose 
difficult logistical problems if “military operations of consequence by either 
Western or indigenous forces were to be supported in the South Asia area.” The 
authors added an important qualification to this statement, noting that South Asian 
                                                 




countries contiguous to the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan and presumably Pakistan51, did 
“offer the possibility of ideological and intelligence penetration of the U.S.S.R. 
because the peoples of Soviet Central Asia have national and personal affinities 
with the peoples” of South Asia, and the Near and Middle East. In addition, the 
JCS also believed that the domination of South Asia by the Soviets would make 
available to the U.S.S.R. “certain raw materials and would threaten sea routes that 
are now relatively safe.” In the next sentence the Joint Chiefs make perhaps the 
most important statement of the period regarding the strategic value of South Asia 
stating that the “inaccessibility of the area from the north” and the “more 
remunerative objectives” in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East “make it 
unlikely that, in the event of war, the U.S.S.R. would expend substantial military 
effort in South Asia.”52                                    
1950-1951: The Turning Point 
 At the end of the 1940’s Pakistan still occupied the fringes of America’s 
strategic outlook on the Cold War. American planners believed the U.S.S.R. had 
little interest in the region as a whole, much less Pakistan. In addition there 
existed a laundry list of reasons why the United States should cultivate relations 
with India over Pakistan. It would not take long however for American priorities 
in South Asia to shift dramatically. This would eventually include bringing 
Pakistan into U.S. plans for the defense of the Middle East. The turning point in 
Pakistani-U.S. relations was the Korean War. For many years, American officials 
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believed that Korea was an event orchestrated by the Soviet Union and that the 
Soviets could potentially implement similar “plans” elsewhere. U.S. officials saw 
the Middle East as an area of potential Soviet incursions and in anticipation of 
such actions planned to fight the Soviets with Pakistani troops.   
According to Robert McMahon, the Korean War transformed American 
attitudes and policies towards Pakistan more than any other single event, and it 
appears that this was a result of both plain serendipity and American fears about 
future “Koreas.”53 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had come to the United 
States in May of 1950 to continue Pakistan’ s quest for American economic aid 
and Khan received favorable coverage in American newspapers. A New York 
Times editorial on May 3 hailed Pakistan’s devotion to the cause of freedom and 
in particular cited Khan’s declaration that “ ‘no threat or persuasion, no material 
peril or ideological allurement’ could deflect his country from its chosen path of 
free democracy.” In addition, the Times believed that Khan had made it plain that 
“Pakistanis understand their peril and are determined upon their defense.”54 
According to George McGhee, while Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit had received much 
more media attention, Khan did enjoy substantial talks with President Truman and 
the State Department, “including assurances that Pakistani forces would be 
available in the event of a Communist military threat to South Asia from the 
north.” Whether or not it occurred to Truman or a member of the State 
Department that Pakistani forces would probably not have a choice in the matter 
or that the prospect of such a threat appeared remote is not known. Regardless, 
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McGhee, then assistant secretary for Near East and South Asian affairs, also 
wrote that the Prime Minister and his wife were a hit on the Washington social 
scene, appearing on Eleanor Roosevelt’s television show. For McGhee, 
“compared to the wishy-washy neutralist Indians [Pakistanis] were a breath of 
fresh air.” 55  
Before leaving the U.S., Khan also received medical treatment in Boston 
at the end of June.56 On June 25, North Korea invaded South Korea. Three days 
later, the Prime Minister announced that Pakistan would “ ‘back the United 
Nations to the fullest’ in any action it may take in the Korean War” and a few 
days later, in New York, declared that Pakistan accepted the UN resolution to aid 
South Korea “knowing full well what the implications [were].”57 Pakistan’s 
willingness to support the U.S. in the first days of the war made such an 
impression that John F. Kennedy, who later played a major role in reversing 
America’s South Asian strategic orientation back in favor of India in 1962-63, 
welcomed Mohammed Ayub Khan to the United States in 1961 by declaring that 
“during the difficult days which faced our country at the time of the war in Korea, 
one of the first to offer us assistance was your country.”58  Kennedy made this 
statement ignoring what S.M. Burke, McMahon, and others are quick to point out 
which is that Pakistan’s statements of solidarity with the U.S. and the UN in the 
summer of 1950 did not result in substantial Pakistani material or personnel 
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contributions to combat operations in Korea.59 Despite persistent U.S. requests, 
Pakistan did not provide military personnel for the UN effort in Korea for fear 
that dispatching any troops would be a grave risk to its local security vis-à-vis 
India, though U.S. officials believed that if tensions in South Asia were removed, 
Pakistan would probably contribute troops.60 In 1951, Pakistan offered troops for 
Korea but in exchange for the United States’ “complete and unqualified” support 
of Pakistan in disputes with India and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Acheson 
rejected the offer believing that such a deal would have completely alienated the 
U.S. from India and Afghanistan.61 Despite this, many historians consider the 
public relations victory for Pakistan in the minds of American policy makers at 
the time one of the key factors in the eventual ascendancy of Pakistan over India 
in American strategic planning. 
McMahon also considers the Korean War fundamental to American and 
British reassessments of Middle East security. At the very least the war 
contributed to a heightened sense of urgency regarding the protection of the 
region’s invaluable resources. However, McMahon points out that the growth of 
U.S. interest in Pakistan was limited.62 In September of 1950 representatives of 
the British Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department, including George 
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McGhee, met and discussed “the help Pakistan might provide in stemming any 
military advance towards the Middle East and the Near East generally.” 
Apparently, the group agreed only that Pakistan might help but with the important 
qualification of being “free from internal worries on the subcontinent.” McGhee 
also made it clear that while the U.S. had “taken an increased interest in [India 
and Pakistan’s] military strength” because of Korea, “the relative priority position 
of India and Pakistan [had] probably gone down” because of “increased 
demands… from other more critical areas.” 63  
The impact of Korea on British thinking is somewhat clearer in a 
conversation between B.A.B. Burrows of the British Embassy and State 
Department officials in October of 1950. Burrows sought to convince U.S. 
officials that the Middle East deserved greater priority in American plans for both 
a “global war” and “a localized Korean type conflict.” Burrows spoke of his 
country’s military presence in Egypt in particular as an example of forces 
dedicated to defending the Middle East. In the same way, the British wanted the 
U.S. “to come into a Korea like situation in the Middle East quickly [and] for this 
purpose the U.S. would need forces stationed in the area… which would help 
prevent such a situation from arising and help to prevent the outbreak of global 
war and the loss to the West of the Middle East.” Later on, in discussing nations 
that would possibly contribute to the defense of the Middle East, Burrows 
mentions that Pakistan “could probably be counted on for substantial help.” 
George McGhee however informed Burrows that the U.S. planned to concentrate 
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its efforts more “upon the strengthening of Turkey” and stated his belief that 
“whichever side might hold the area, the oil fields would be neutralized through 
air bombardment.”64 
Although the basic policy of the U.S. regarding Pakistan did not change 
immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, it appears that the 
notion that Pakistan could be of assistance to the U.S. in defending the Middle 
East and South Asia gained greater purchase in 1950 and 1951. McMahon cites a 
State Department conference in Colombo, Ceylon in March of 1951. Among 
other things, the conference concluded, “the most effective military defense of 
this area [presumably the arc of nations from Turkey eastward to India] would be 
provided by strong flanks which on the east would include Pakistan.” According 
to a representative of the U.S. Navy at the conference, U.S. interests in the region 
“would be reinforced by moving at once in this critical period to develop 
Pakistan’s capacity to support us in war.”65 The impact of the American policy 
makers’ frustration with India also played a role in the reasoning of the 
conference goers. According to Ayesha Jalal, Loy Henderson, U.S. Ambassador 
to India at the time, concluded that “Washington should ‘deal with… [Nehru] 
firmly and patiently’ and ‘go ahead with Pakistan as a friendly country.’ ”66 Not 
long afterwards in Malta and in London, British and American military and 
diplomatic officials spoke with more certainty on the necessity of Pakistan to 
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defense of the Middle East. The meeting at Malta, ignoring the persistent material 
shortcomings of the Pakistani military along with the persistent economic and 
political weaknesses, concluded “both Pakistan and India have strong land forces 
which are well placed to intervene promptly in this area.”67 George McGhee, 
speaking with British officials in London a few weeks later, claimed that 
Pakistan’s role in defending the Near East, “particularly in the mountains facing 
Russia… was obvious and would probably be the decisive factor in ensuring the 
defense of this area.”68 By May of 1951, speaking to members of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, McGhee claimed, “without Pakistan, I don’t see anyway to defend the 
Middle East.” The Chairman of the JCS at the time, Omar Bradley, remarked, 
“perhaps we should throw civilian production in the ashcan and arm these 
countries- Pakistan, Turkey, and Western Europe.”69 How seriously Bradley took 
the arming of Pakistan and others in response to McGhee’s comments is not clear 
but Bradley’s response, as well as McGhee’s statement, illustrate an important 
development in the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan 
was not considered simply a potential contributor to Middle East defense but 
essential. Regarding Bradley’s response to McGhee, it is quite possible that 
Bradley made this comment in passing or at least without considering it seriously, 
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as he does lump Pakistan and Turkey in with “Western Europe.” Despite this 
possibility, Bradley’s affirmative response was still significant simply because of 
his position. A dismissal of McGhee’s claims could have and likely would have 
altered the direction of U.S. thinking on Pakistan. 
Another significant shift in the thinking of the U.S. regarding Pakistan in 
1951 is evident in the State Department’s policy statement on Pakistan in July. In 
previous years, while addressing the deep rifts in the subcontinent, the United 
States had at least paid lip-service to the idea that the fates and potentials of India 
and Pakistan were tied together. In the State Department’s policy statement on 
Pakistan in May of 1950, the authors describe India-Pakistan entente as remote 
and India potentially “Japan’s successor in Asiatic imperialism.” In the end 
however, the authors admit, “our interests should be better served by cooperation 
than by rivalry between India and Pakistan as long as Soviet expansionism 
threatens South Asia.”70 The policy statement for 1951 describes Pakistan as 
“geographically a part of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent,” but “it is politically 
independent with an inherent importance separate and distinct from India.” 
Furthermore, Pakistan “cannot expect any assistance from India in defending its 
frontiers…[and] India may refuse to give open support should aggression against 
Near East countries occur.” The policy statement concludes by stating that 
Pakistan’s orientation towards the Middle East, its control of the historic invasion 
routes into South Asia, and “its present leaning toward the West gives Pakistan a 
                                                 





political identity which transcends the historical ties that tend to bind it to 
India.”71  
While the subcontinent had been partitioned for less than four years when 
the State Department made this judgment, it appears that the U.S. frustration with 
a neutral India, fears for the security of the oil-rich Middle East, and the 
persistence of traditional understandings of Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance 
led the U.S. to remove Pakistan conceptually from the subcontinent. By doing so, 
the U.S. would to make Pakistan a Middle Eastern power without having to 
resolve Pakistan’s basic obstacle to development: its obsessive fear of India. 
1952-1954: An Alliance Takes Shape 
While it would appear that the U.S. had made up its mind in 1951 that 
military assistance for Pakistan had become necessary, it would not offer such 
assistance immediately. It appears that much of the discussion revolved around 
taking the rather broad directive of assisting Pakistan and figuring out a way to 
implement it. The lack of substantial U.S. action resulted in yet another attempt 
by Pakistani officials to make a case for their country. In July 1952 the Pakistani 
ambassador to the U.S., Mohammed Ali,72 met with Secretary of Defense Robert 
Lovett. Ali claimed that while “relatively few months ago, Pakistan’s main 
concern militarily…[was] meeting any aggressive designs of India… [but] the 
more recent developments in Korea and China, and within Russia itself, had 
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changed the picture entirely and now Pakistan’s main concern was the fear that 
she might be subjected any day to aggression from Communists.” Accordingly, 
Pakistan had “revised its entire strategy and… build up its forces to oppose 
Communist aggression.” The Ambassador also proffered the theory that because 
of the lack of funding for the defense of the Middle East it would be “only 
common sense strategy” for the Communists “to concentrate any opening 
hostilities on an area… whose defense potentials [had] not been built up by the 
United States.” The Secretary of Defense of course did not see things this way 
and reminded the Ambassador of the aid had been made available to Pakistan and 
the more immediate concerns of the U.S. elsewhere.73  It should be noted however 
that from 1947 to 1952, Pakistan received less than half a million dollars a year in 
U.S. aid.74 
Similarly, 1952 passed without significant changes in the American 
approach to Pakistan. However, other nations did weigh in on Pakistan’s proposed 
role in Middle East defense, along with diplomat and outspoken India-booster 
Chester Bowles. In November British officials, acting independent of the U.S., 
developed separate plans for including Pakistan in a defensive arrangement. The 
reactions of France and Turkey indicate perhaps how other nations would have 
reacted to American plans for Pakistan had they been consulted. According to 
Dennis Kux, French officials noted that Pakistan was farther from the Middle East 
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than was Greece, which was not being considered in British or U.S. plans, and 
Turkey expressed worry about the reaction of India and Afghanistan.75 Around 
the same time, Chester Bowles claimed “no sensible person could question the 
creation of MEDO76 or eventual inclusion of Pakistan in its orbit…[and] in the 
face of the threat of Soviet aggression all of them must sooner or later hang 
together or assuredly they may hang separately.” However, in the same telegram 
Bowles wondered about the impact of Pakistan’s participation on the region 
considering that none of the nations contiguous with Pakistan would do so. In 
addition, Bowles believed the Soviets, who had been placing pressure on Iran and 
Afghanistan, would not increase their involvement to counter a stronger U.S.-
Pakistan relationship. Bowles also claimed that since Britain, France, and South 
Africa were regarded as colonial powers in Asia and associated with the defense 
arrangement, the U.S. would be seen as “party to an effort to perpetuate a dying 
colonial order in the name of collective security.”77 Despite the potential problems 
in the U.S. approach or the consequences of its implementation, plans for Pakistan 
appeared to move forward. As for Bowles, the victory of Eisenhower a few weeks 
earlier had rendered him a lame duck. In early December, the State Department’s 
South Asia chief Donald Kennedy informed the British, “Bowles would soon be 
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out anyway,” and according to Kux, added that “the pluses of helping the 
Pakistanis militarily outweighed the minuses.”78 
When Dwight Eisenhower took office in January of 1953, the fortunes of 
Pakistan improved once again. Kux claims that when Eisenhower tapped John 
Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, the new Secretary brought with him a positive 
impression of Pakistan, and just the opposite of India. Dulles, like most American 
policy makers, abhorred India’s neutralism, and by the same token appreciated 
Pakistan’s endorsement of American efforts regarding Korea.79 In addition, the 
Secretary visited Pakistan in May and June of 1953, where Pakistani leaders 
reiterated their claims of Pakistan’s military value to the U.S. During Dulles’ visit 
Pakistani General Mohammed Ayub Khan80 offered an interesting twist on the 
argument for arming Pakistan. Khan felt “very strongly that if Pakistan were 
strengthened by United States economic and military aid, it would result in India 
dropping its present intransigent attitude, both towards Kashmir and other 
problems… a strong Pakistan would frighten India out of her passiveness…”81 
 Though sources do not indicate how Dulles received this rather dubious 
argument, Dulles concluded “Pakistan is one country that has the moral courage 
to do its part resisting communism…[that] Pakistan would be a cooperative 
member of any defense scheme that may emerge in the Middle East and that we 
may not await formal defense arrangements as [a] condition to some military 
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assistance to Pakistan.”82 Before the National Security Council in June, Dulles 
“described himself as immensely impressed by the martial and religious 
characteristics of the Pakistanis. These qualities had made him and Mr. Stassen 
(director of the Mutual Security Agency) feel that Pakistan was a potential strong 
point for us.” At the same meeting Dulles also offered a new twist on the Middle 
East Defense Organization, one that he believed “offered much more than the 
former project.” Instead of centering the arrangement on Egypt as the British had 
planned, Dulles’ offered a defensive “northern tier” of countries including 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan.83 Aside from “feeling the hot breath of the 
Soviet Union on their necks,” the Pakistanis were also “most keenly aware” of 
this threat and were geographically located to stand in the way of Soviet 
aggression.84 Following Dulles’ efforts, other memos touting Pakistan’s 
importance circulated, and General Khan spoke on the subject before an audience 
at the National War College in September of 1953.85   
The New York Times also addressed the issue in November. An editorial 
claimed there were “several factors that make close association with Pakistan 
desirable from our point of view.” Aside from Pakistan “developing along the 
sturdy democratic lines we admire,” the Times points up the young nation’s rapid 
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“economic and social progress.”86 The credibility of this editorial is questionable 
given that the U.S. recognized that the dismissal of the Pakistani Prime Minister 
in April of 1953 had been orchestrated by the Pakistani military, and the National 
Intelligence Estimate from June of 1953 described Pakistan’s present and 
probable economic situation as poor.87 Also in 1953, the United States gave 
Pakistan 700,000 tons of wheat which “saved the country from the ravages of 
famine.”88 In addition to the supposed progress of Pakistan, the author also 
restated a familiar claim as to the military tradition and military potential of 
Pakistan going so far as to argue that the relationship between Pakistan and the 
U.S. might prove to be as vital to India’s defense as to that of Pakistan. 
In February of 1954, the National Security Council made enlisting 
Pakistan specifically in efforts to combat communism an objective in NSC 5409. 
This included giving Pakistan “special consideration… in providing grant military 
assistance, in view of Pakistan’s attitude and key position among the countries of 
South Asia.”89 A draft of this paper included remarks that, for some reason, do not 
appear in the final version, published in the Foreign Relations of the United 
States. Among them is a statement that points out the persistent American belief 
that the strategic importance of South Asia “would not be as great as that of many 
other areas of the world” that would likely be involved in a global war. The draft 
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also stated that ocean and mountain barriers separate South Asia from the Soviet 
Bloc, rendering the area “relatively immune” to all but extremely costly and 
probably unprofitable attacks. However, the draft continues stating that “the sole 
exception to this geographical immunity is Pakistan which might be drawn into a 
general war as the result of a Soviet invasion of Iranian territory.”90 
As for actual military aid for Pakistan, President Eisenhower agreed in 
principle to proceeding with this in January of 1954 with the provision that the 
U.S. attempt to allay fears that the U.S. would aid Pakistan against India. To do 
this the Eisenhower, Dulles, and Stassen agreed to emphasize that U.S. aid would 
be  
“part of a regional security pact being initiated by Turkey and Pakistan 
with other countries in the area potential additions and… indicate to India that 
[the U.S.] would be prepared to extend military aid to India under the same type 
of agreement as was offered to Pakistan.”91   
 
On February 14 the New York Times reported that the National Security 
Council had decided to grant Pakistan aid the previous week. The author pointed 
out the still unresolved problem of Indian opposition to such a deal but remarked 
that “the importance of bringing in Pakistan on the defense of the Middle East is 
greater than the importance of preserving pleasant relations with Mr. Nehru.” In 
addition, the reader learns that some in the Eisenhower administration felt that the 
harsh debate on the subject may “do some good by separating the neutralist 
nations from the pro-Western nations in that part of the world.” Consistent with 
the discussions of Eisenhower, Dulles, and Stassen in January, the article also 
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emphasized the initiative of Turkey and Pakistan. According to the author, “once 
the nations on the Soviet Union’s southern border agreed to work together to 
defend themselves against Soviet aggression, then the United States will offer to 
become their arsenal.”92 Turkey and Pakistan fulfilled this requirement on 
February 19 and on February 24 Eisenhower announced that Pakistan would 
receive military assistance to strengthen the defense potential of the Middle 
East.93 In May the U.S. and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement and later in the year Pakistan joined the U.S. and others in the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. As mentioned previously, in 1955 Pakistan 
would also join the U.S.-backed Baghdad Pact, which would later become the 
Central Treaty Organization, and in 1959 sign a bilateral Agreement of 
Cooperation with the United States, Turkey, and Iran. In a few years, Pakistan 
went from the periphery of America’s strategic vision to being, in the exaggerated 
words of General Mohammed Ayub, “America’s most allied ally in Asia.”94       
Conclusion 
 
 It is difficult to find an analysis of American-Pakistani relations in this 
period that is not defined by the exaggerations and miscalculations of the 
governments in Washington and Karachi. While Jalal’s State of Martial Rule has 
appeared throughout these pages and is perhaps the seminal work on the 
development of the military domination of Pakistan, Jalal’s article for The 
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International History Review is more indicative of her sense of the development 
of American policies with respect to Pakistan. Jalal began by assuming that the 
present-day Middle East and South Asia are the result of rivalry between the 
United States and Great Britain more than of the rivalry between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union. As a result of this rivalry, both the British and the Americans 
pursued the cultivation of their own client states and plans for regional alliance 
systems. Once it became clear to the British that they could not compete with the 
U.S. in terms of either financial or political clout, the British acquiesced and 
backed U.S. efforts. Jalal’s novel approach aside, American officials appear to 
have possessed faint understanding of the “subcontinental realities” with which 
their British counterparts, though far from perfect, had much more experience. 
According to Jalal, the United States disregarded the reaction of both India and 
the Soviet Union to military aid for Pakistan. In addition to being “short-sighted” 
and “insolent,” the U.S. made decisions “irrespective of British interests,” 
decisions that essentially tore “apart the fragile web of Great Britain’s interests in 
both South Asia and the Middle East.” In the case of Pakistan, Jalal insisted that 
the U.S. decision to prop up the “pro-Western ruling clique” in Pakistan was 
made regardless of the “long-term effects on [Pakistan’s] fledgling state 
structure.” The same was true of the U.S. decision to encourage Pakistan’s 
aspirations to leadership in the Muslim world. Thus, according to Jalal, before 
even granting aid, the U.S. “chalked out [Pakistan’s] future at home as well as 
abroad.”95 
                                                 




 Like Jalal, Robert McMahon’s work on the formation of American 
policies in South Asia is also of fundamental importance though McMahon 
examined American-Pakistani relations in a more traditional context. McMahon 
believed that America’s relationship to Pakistan was in large part a reaction to 
Cold War fears of Soviet moves against the Middle East, and to a lesser extent, 
South Asia. In his article for The Journal of American History, McMahon claimed 
that while most interpretations of the Cold War tended to see “American policy 
makers operating from a clear-headed conception of national interests,” in the 
case of Pakistan, “American policy…was driven by a remarkably imprecise and 
inchoate formulation of the nation’s strategic needs.” McMahon believed that 
U.S. planners never addressed, specifically, how Pakistan would stabilize the 
Middle East or precisely how Pakistani troops would help thwart a Soviet 
incursion into the region.96 
 McMahon and Jalal’s appraisals of U.S. policy are accurate to a certain 
extent. It is doubtful that American officials understood the innumerable conflicts 
that beset South Asia nor did American planners grasp that their policies would, 
in part, help warp the development of Pakistan’s civil and military institutions. At 
many points, the rhetoric of U.S. policy makers regarding Pakistan’s strategic 
importance does not appear coherent or, in many cases, accurate. However, this 
view of American-Pakistani relations should be tempered by an understanding of 
the immediate experiences of both the American and Pakistani officials. Many of 
the U.S. officials who touted Pakistan’s strategic value were operating under the 
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expectation that a global war with the Soviet Union was very likely. Many of 
these officials were no doubt greatly influenced by the Second World War, a war 
defined, in part, by the strategic assets of the Allies and the Axis. Pakistani 
officials also harbored expectations of an imminent, global war and believed their 
region, contiguous with the Soviet Union, would no doubt be involved. Together 
with the staggering odds against their nation’s survival, the results of both internal 
weakness and regional tension, it is hardly surprising that Pakistanis leaders 
promoted to potential allies a feature of their country that could at least be 
construed as a strength. While none of this justifies incoherent or misleading 
assessments of Pakistan’s value to the United States, it does improve our 
understanding of a series of policy decisions that exaggerated Pakistan’s strategic 
value, increased regional tensions, and afforded little benefit to America’s Cold 
War efforts.        
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 The alliance of the 1950’s between the United States and Pakistan began 
to crumble in the early 1960’s. There are several explanations for this, not the 
least of which was the election of John F. Kennedy, who had for several years 
advocated a South Asian policy that favored India. In addition, the shooting down 
of the U-2 spy plane based in Peshawar, Pakistan, in May of 1960, also 
contributed to the deterioration of U.S.-Pakistani relations. Sharp differences in 
American and Pakistani opinion regarding the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and 1963 
and the U.S. arms embargo following the outbreak of war between India and 
Pakistan in 1965 ended America’s close relationship with Pakistan for the time 
being. Both McMahon and Kux believe that after the 1965 war, the U.S. 
consciously maintained a considerably lower profile in the region. Though the 
Nixon administration made it U.S. policy to “tilt” toward Pakistan, the United 
States did not provide substantial aid to Pakistan until after the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in late December, 1979. This chapter will focus on U.S. 
thinking regarding Pakistan in the years and months before the invasion as well as 
on the shift in U.S. thinking afterwards. It will be shown that prior to the Soviet 
action against Afghanistan, U.S. policy regarding Pakistan focused primarily on 
encouraging the practice of democracy, discouraging the growth of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and discouraging Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Discussion of 
 
Pakistan’s strategic importance was almost entirely absent. However, after the 
invasion, U.S. policy focused particularly on Pakistan’s strategic value and, more 
importantly, Pakistan’s ability to aid the Mujahedin in Afghanistan fighting the 
Soviets. 
The Decline of Democracy in Pakistan 
 As evident in previous pages, Jalal’s The State of Martial Rule is 
invaluable to understanding how the military and civil service came to rule 
Pakistan to the detriment of democratic institutions. Though focusing primarily on 
the first decade of independence, Jalal also endeavors to explain, however briefly, 
the ways in which the patterns of that first decade persisted long afterwards. In the 
final chapter, Jalal addresses the series of dictatorships that ruled Pakistan from 
1958 to 1990. The ruler of Pakistan at the beginning of the Carter administration, 
Zulfikar Bhutto, came to power following another costly war with India in 1971 
in which Pakistan was not only humiliated by her rival but also lost over half of 
her population, as East Pakistan gained independence as Bangladesh.  Bhutto was 
unusual in Pakistani history as he did not come into power as a military leader but 
as a civil servant who had served Pakistan for many years in foreign affairs. 
Bhutto was also the first leader of Pakistan to advocate socialism. As leader of the 
Pakistan People’s Party, Bhutto promised wide-ranging economic, social, and 
political reforms. However, Jalal points out that despite his personal prestige, 
Bhutto’s reforms still needed the cooperation of the civil bureaucracy and his 
political, if not actual, survival still required at least the tacit support of the 




had to expand political patronage within the civil service, which, according to 
Jalal, only perpetuated the corruption of Pakistan’s government. As for the 
military’s persistent threat to his regime, Bhutto was required to placate it through 
an expansion of its budget. Bhutto did not adequately address the absence of 
accountability for the military and civil bureaucracy, the fundamental problem of 
the Pakistani government. Consequently, Islamic parties began to grow in 
popularity. Jalal believes this was a reaction not only to the shortcomings of 
Bhutto’s government but also to a broader feeling that the events of 1971, and the 
lingering after-effects, had been the result of the state’s lack of Islamic morality. 
The Bhutto government attempted to cultivate support among Pakistan’s more 
traditional sources of political power, big landowners in particular, and at the 
same time to develop Bhutto’s Islamic credentials.97   
 As Bhutto managed to keep control of Pakistan into 1976, George 
McGovern, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian 
Affairs for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and India. McGovern’s subsequent report began by addressing the foreign policy 
outlook for Pakistan. In addition to cultivating relationships with the Arab world, 
China, and the United States, Pakistan was attempting to improve its ties to 
Bangladesh. This was approached with some caution given the likely impact such 
developments would have on relations with India. It was quite clear to McGovern 
that the Pakistanis and Indians were both still suspicious of each other as 
McGovern’s party was informed “in Islamabad and in Delhi that there was no 
                                                 





doubt that the other side was preparing for war at that moment.” In geopolitical 
terms, Pakistanis expressed a great deal of foreboding according to McGovern. 
Many were not sure that a historically turbulent relationship with Afghanistan 
could be improved, and worried about long-term Afghan and Soviet plans. 
According to McGovern this had led to Pakistan diligently “trying to promote 
solutions to continuing issues with her neighbors” as well as seeking moral and 
monetary support from the West as well as Arab states.98  
 Regarding American military aid to Pakistan, McGovern claimed that the 
Pakistanis had been discreet in their requests for military equipment in 1975 and 
that most of the purchases had been for non-lethal equipment. Since the Pakistanis 
appeared to be willing to restrain their requests, the only problem seemed to be 
the question of sophisticated American military aircraft. On this point McGovern 
endorsed what he saw as the U.S. arms policy in South Asia, avoiding the 
potentially provocative build-up of any armed force. McGovern believed that 
while Pakistan should maintain defense forces that could deter an attack, 
“Pakistan cannot afford to build a military force which would threaten neighbors.” 
To do so would initiate an arms race throughout the subcontinent and “a building 
of the military chips higher and higher to no avail.”99 
While the foreign policy outlook for Pakistan appeared far from bright, 
McGovern’s report indicated that the primary challenges facing Pakistan were 
internal weaknesses, not the least of which was the rule of Bhutto. While it is 
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noted that Bhutto maintained the charisma that had brought him to power initially, 
he was also forceful, ruling “with a firm hand which many believe is becoming 
more authoritarian.” McGovern pointed out the growing numbers of political 
prisoners as well as the “ominous growth” of Pakistan’s central intelligence 
bureau, central police, and central security force. In addition to his “extremely 
personal hold on power,” McGovern stated, “Mr. Bhutto appears to have done 
little to build political institutions which could outlast him. There is no heir 
apparent.” The bulk of McGovern’s report deals with the myriad problems that 
faced Pakistan at the time including its under-developed democratic institutions, a 
drain of educated and skilled workers to other nations, 80% illiteracy, and high 
infant mortality. In the end, while McGovern claimed to feel that “Pakistan may 
be on the way to eventual, relative prosperity,” he warned of the growth of 
authoritarianism, the paucity of bureaucratic talent, and the considerable financial 
difficulties facing Pakistan.100 
The Carter Administration 
While interviewing Arthur Hummel, the former ambassador to Pakistan in 
1994, Charles Stuart Kennedy remarked, “the Democratic party… in very rough 
terms seems to lean toward India.” Considering that some of the major policy 
changes regarding South Asia have coincided with changes in the White House in 
terms of party control, Kennedy’s remark is not without merit. Party predilections 
aside, Jimmy Carter also had personal ties to India in that his mother had served 
as a Peace Corps volunteer in the country. According to Hummel, Pakistanis 
themselves believed that Democrats would prefer India and Republicans would 
                                                 




prefer Pakistan. As for Hummel himself, he believed that the Pakistani assessment 
had “quite a bit of truth in it,”101 and as it turned out, the Carter administration 
would preside over the low point in the history of Pakistani-American relations in 
November 1979. It should be noted however that developments inside Pakistan 
were likely more influential than any biases of the Carter administration. In fact, 
at the beginning of the Carter presidency, the assessments of South Asia and 
Pakistan in regards to U.S. security and political interests were quite optimistic. 
In March 1977, in a statement before the House Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, Adolph Dubs, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East 
and South Asian Affairs, stated that at that time the South Asian nations all 
enjoyed full and normal diplomatic relations for the first time since 1962. Dubs 
also believed that the regional tensions that had characterized the relations among 
South Asian countries were decreasing. Direct U.S. security interests in South 
Asia were limited and the U.S. accordingly pursued a policy of restraint regarding 
the sale of military equipment. The U.S. had no military bases on the 
Subcontinent nor did the U.S. seek such bases and aside from “modest military 
training programs, we offer no grant military aid in South Asia.” Regarding the 
political interests of the U.S. in the region, Dubs admitted that while not 
insignificant they were relatively modest and were best served by “encouraging 
the evolution of a stable regional system, free of outside domination.” Dubs also 
commented on the recent election that had taken place in Pakistan. Dubs claimed 
that during the election there were “broad-ranging, extremely free debates on the 
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domestic issues confronting” Pakistan.102 Dubs comments are curious given that 
the elections of March 7 would precipitate a serious deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan 
relations.           
 In one of the few election years in Pakistan’s history, Bhutto had faced a 
nine party opposition coalition, which, as Jalal notes, had nothing in common 
except the objective of dismantling the regime.103 Despite the challenges facing 
the Bhutto government, the election ended in a landslide victory for Bhutto. This 
victory however was quickly followed by widespread claims of rigging. 
According to Arthur Hummel, who had been appointed as the U.S. ambassador to 
Pakistan in June 1977, Bhutto had no reason to rig the election but did so and was 
simply caught at it.104 Henry Byroade, Hummel’s predecessor, suggested however 
that Bhutto was losing badly in key areas the night of the election and the next 
day won 155 of 200 seats in the Pakistan National Assembly.105  
The election resulted in widespread violence in the major urban areas of 
Pakistan and a U.S. State Department decision to block the export of tear gas 
rounds to Pakistan as a punitive measure.106 Bhutto responded to the American 
action in a letter to then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Bhutto suggested to 
Vance that the United States had been supporting his opposition who had 
“launched a violent campaign designed to subvert the Constitution and undermine 
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the stability of Pakistan.” Apparently, Bhutto had also discussed “concrete 
instances” of U.S. interference in Pakistan with Byroade, although Kux claims 
“Pakistan’s intelligence service had been unable to produce anything concrete 
when pressed by the Pakistani government for evidence.” 107 Bhutto also claimed 
that the Soviets were “massively” interfering in Pakistan and informed the Saudi 
Ambassador to Pakistan that the Soviets wanted to “dismember” Pakistan. 
According to Kux, it is doubtful that, at least in the case of the U.S., Bhutto’s 
accusations were much more than attempts to gain political leverage on the 
Americans.108  
According to Hummel, Bhutto’s “anti-American slant only showed up 
when he was in such dire trouble after he rigged the elections… before that he’d 
been a relatively close friend of the United States… there was no anti-American 
slant before that.”109 If Bhutto’s actions were indeed acts of desperation they did 
little to improve his situation in Pakistan for the long term as members of the 
Pakistani military ousted Bhutto in June 1977. Led by General Muhammad Zia-
ul-Haq, this junta promised new elections for the near future and Zia himself 
assured Bhutto that he would return to power shortly. As it turned out however, 
Zia would rule Pakistan until 1988 and he had Bhutto executed for murder in 
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April 1979 following a lengthy trial and numerous requests for clemency from 
Carter and others worldwide.110 
 Despite these developments in Pakistan, the U.S. State Department did not 
back away from its positive outlook on South Asia. On March 16, 1978, Adolph 
Dubs would again appear before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. Dubs claimed “regional tensions are at their lowest level since 1947” and 
cited, “a constructive dialogue between India and China” and “a continued 
improvement in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Apparently the 
State Department credited these developments to the leadership of the individual 
nations of South Asia and noted that their stabilizing effects were “very much in 
line with the foreign policy objectives of the United States.” In regard to Pakistan 
specifically, Dubs offered a brief summary of the passing of the Bhutto regime 
and the lack of substantial policy decisions on the part of Zia’s “interim” 
government. Dubs did not indicate he had a sense that Pakistani-American 
relations were going to worsen in the near future nor did he indicate awareness of 
events outside Pakistan that would shortly destabilize the region. Dubs claimed 
that the internal political situation in Afghanistan was stable and that 
Afghanistan’s President, Mohammed Daoud Khan, remained “very much in 
control and face[d] no significant opposition.” In addition, Dubs stated, 
“Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors are good, and this contributes 
significantly to the region’s political stability… Afghan-Pak [sic] relations are 
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better than they have been in years.”111 Despite Dubs’ public optimism and 
apparently to the State Department’s complete surprise, Daoud’s rule would end 
abruptly in a coup the next month.112 Daoud and his family would be killed and a 
government much more friendly to the Soviet Union would take its place. Dubs 
himself became the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan in July 1978 and was killed 
by Afghan insurgents on February 14, 1979.113 
Greater Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan 
 Changes in the U.S. outlook on South Asia would be reflected, in part, in 
David Newsom’s address to the Council on Foreign Relations in October 1978. 
Newsom, then Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department, 
began by offering a less-than-favorable assessment of past U.S. policy in South 
Asia. Newsom believed that in previous decades the U.S. had been  
“Preoccupied with the outside threats to the area…[and] not sufficiently 
conscious of the conflicting motives of the nations of the area in joining with us. 
They had their local objectives, their local rivalries which often transcended their 
concern over external forces.”  
 
In some ways, Newsom’s comments could be considered an indictment of 
U.S. policy regarding Pakistan as it appears that Pakistan, particularly in the early 
1950’s, may have used the specter of Russian expansion to gain American arms 
that were, in reality, intended for the struggle against India. Regardless, Newsom 
went on to state that the “one dimensional strategic view of the 1950’s and 1960’s 
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has been replaced by a more diverse and more complex outlook.” Though the 
U.S., Newsom argued, no longer looked at the region “exclusively through the 
prism of East-West rivalry,” he acknowledged that the Soviet Union saw 
“important interests of its own in South Asia.” Among them was a historical effort 
to “improve its access to the Indian Ocean.” In addition Newsom stated that while 
the U.S. had no desire to return to the “rhetoric and political environment of the 
1950’s and 1960’s,” it was not in U.S. interests, nor those of South Asian nations, 
for the Soviets to pursue their objectives “through the achievement of 
predominant and exclusive influence over individual nations,” undoubtedly a 
reference to the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the preceding months.114 
Though Newsom did not address many problems of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship 
specifically, his address still represents not only an important shift in U.S. policy 
regarding Soviet interests in the region, which had not been a major concern for 
some years, but also an enlightening and revealing comment by the State 
Department regarding its previous policies.  
In the same issue of the Department of State Bulletin, there appeared a 
statement of the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Leslie Gelb. 
The bureau acted as a link between the State Department and the Department of 
Defense and in October 1978 Gelb appeared before the House Armed Services 
Committee to speak on the subject of the Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean. 
While Newsom eschewed a “one dimensional strategic view” of the region, 
Gelb’s statement indicates that the U.S. had not completely abandoned a strategic 
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view of South Asia. Though admitting that the Soviets maintained a “fairly low 
military presence in the Indian Ocean,” Gelb claimed that “for centuries Russians 
have wanted a secure southern border and outlet to the sea.” “Thus,” according to 
Gelb, “the Soviets are seeking to increase their political influence in littoral states 
and to maximize regional support for Soviet policies and objectives.”115 
At a meeting in December 1978 between the Pakistani Ambassador to the 
U.S., Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, and Carter’s chief national security advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, there is evidence that Soviet influence in South Asia was 
growing. On the subject of Khan’s recent appointment to the Pakistani embassy in 
Moscow, Khan believed that it “probably did reflect a Pakistani desire to reach a 
better accommodation with the Soviets.” Khan went on to reassure Brzezinski that 
“Pakistan would not be jumping into the Soviet camp nor harming its ties with the 
U.S., but the Soviet presence in South Asia is a reality that is making itself felt 
and Pakistan would be unwise to offer provocations,” an approach Brzezinski 
considered “very sensible.” For Brzezinski’s part, he sought to reassure Khan 
regarding U.S. policy in the region, stating, “Our improved relations with India 
are helpful to all parties, including Pakistan.” Perhaps resurrecting America’s 
South Asia policy of the early Truman era, Brzezinski also informed Khan that 
South Asian nations “must think in regional terms for their security.” Though 
recognizing Pakistan’s history vis-à-vis India, Brzezinski claimed there was “a 
larger historical convergence of interest in independence and stability” in the 
region. Despite his reassurances, Brzezinski did point out a salient concern of the 
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Carter administration regarding Pakistan, “the critical issue [of] how Pakistan 
handles [its] domestic problems.” Brzezinski also addressed the U.S. desire to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia, to which, the NSC staff 
member present noted, Khan did not reply. Other than these two issues, according 
to Brzezinski, the U.S. and Pakistan had “no clouds on our bilateral horizon.”116 
In March 1979 Zalmay Khalilzad presented what he believed was 
evidence of increased Soviet pressure on Pakistan. Khalilzad presented a 
background paper titled “Soviet Foreign Policy towards the Northern Tier 
Countries” to the Study Group on the Soviet Union and the Problem of Regional 
Instability at the Council on Foreign Relations. Aside from enumerating the 
Soviets’ general policies and objectives regarding the so-called Northern Tier, 
Khalilzad also offered a brief history of the Soviet Union’s relations with 
Pakistan. Khalilzad’s history of the relationship was marked by an emphasis on 
the Soviets’ propaganda campaigns against Pakistan as well as their traditional 
support of India in the subcontinent’s frequent disputes. In the context of Pakistan 
specifically, Khalilzad claimed, among other things, “Afghanistan is in a 
particularly favorable position to help pro-Soviet forces in Pakistan.”  He also 
discussed at some length the impact of the events in Afghanistan on the Pakistani 
province of Balochistan.117 The sparsely populated province had been the subject 
of a massive military intervention from 1973 to 1977 in response to a 
                                                 
116 “Memorandum of Conversation, December 19, 1978,” National Security Affairs, no. 7, 
Brzezinski Material, Box 33, Folder 9/78-2/79, Jimmy Carter Library. A memo the next day from 
NSC staff member Thomas Thorton to Brzezinski suggested the conversation was “something of a 
milestone in U.S.-Pakistani relations.”  
117 “Soviet Foreign Policy Towards The Northern Tier Countries,” by Zalmay Khalilzad, a 
background paper for the March 28, 1979 meeting of the Study Group on the Soviet Union and the 
Problem of Regional Instability. Box 226, folder 2, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Seeley 




tribal/autonomist insurrection.118 According to Khalilzad, “given the importance 
of the Arabian Sea for the industrial world, the long-standing Soviet desire for a 
warm water port, and the existence of unrest in the area separating Afghanistan 
from the Arabian Sea, Balochistan,” Pakistan’s increased security concerns were 
justified. According to a Khalilzad article for International Security later that 
year, “the control of Balochistan… would extend Soviet influence to a vital area. 
Direct Soviet access to [the Arabian Sea] would greatly increase its capacity to 
interdict oil transports.”119  
In addition to these strategic concerns Khalilzad believed that “the 
takeover of Afghanistan by Khalq120 is likely to increase the probability of joint 
Afghan-Soviet support of secessionist elements in the Balochistan provinces of 
Pakistan and Iran and in the North West Frontier Province.” Apparently, the 
traditional Balochi leadership had been losing ground to radical “leftist groups… 
more closely aligned with the Soviet Union.”121 While the author would later 
recognize that the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan had too much trouble 
dealing with its own insurgency to offer much support for one in Balochistan, he 
would still maintain that, “in the case of a war between Baloch secessionists and 
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the Pakistani armed forces, the Afghans might intervene, either alone or in 
conjunction with the Soviet Union.”122 
According to Ronald Spiers, Reagan’s first ambassador to Pakistan, 
General Zia was also quite concerned about Soviet interest in Balochistan and the 
region as whole. Zia “had countless meetings with Congressional visitors, Cabinet 
members, and other U.S. dignitaries” at his home where “he would display a map, 
on which he super-imposed a red area, which was the part of Asia occupied by the 
Soviets. He really believed this strategic view of the world and was genuinely 
concerned with the “red horde” knocking on his door.” Spiers maintained that he 
believed the “Soviets were essentially improvisers and didn’t have any grandiose 
world plan” and though he did not think the Soviets were “really interested in 
annexing Afghanistan… I thought that there would be a good chance that if the 
Soviets were successful in Afghanistan, they would be tempted to look at 
Balochistan as a necessary buffer and become a threat to Pakistan.”123   
In May of 1979, a U.S. policy statement reiterated U.S. concerns for the 
region as well as indicated an easing of the U.S. stance against Pakistan’s nuclear 
ambitions and internal political problems. Jack Miklos, Adolph Dubs’ 
replacement as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
spoke before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Compared 
with Dubs’ statement before the same committee, a little over a year earlier, 
Miklos’ assessment was far less optimistic in regard to South Asia as a whole. 
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While Dubs had remarked at South Asia’s growing stability and the lack of 
regional tensions, Miklos pointed out, among other things, that several of the 
states were unstable and most had turbulent internal political situations. While 
Miklos claims these countries suffered primarily from internal problems, at the 
same time he insisted “the Soviet Union has and will continue to try and extend 
its influence where it can.” On the subject of Pakistan specifically, however, 
Miklos’ statement indicated that the U.S. wanted to improve its relations with 
Pakistan. Miklos, similar to past American policy makers, stressed Pakistan’s 
importance as “a pivot between the states of the Indian subcontinent and the oil-
rich states of western Asia.”124  
Miklos also discussed the Zia regime in relatively positive terms, 
“warmly” welcoming the announcement of plans for national elections in Pakistan 
and pointing out that Zia had “recently named a Cabinet of essentially nonpartisan 
figures to carry on the work of government and prepare for the elections.” On the 
subject of Zia’s plans to introduce additional Islamic principles to Pakistani law, 
such as the introduction of Sharia courts, and measures to establish interest-free 
banking, Miklos admitted that though “some foresee that Islamic edicts may fall 
haphazardly and unequally on different elements within the society… we 
welcome [the Islamic resurgence in Pakistan and other countries] to apply the 
humanitarian and social ideals of this great religion.” On the subject of Pakistan’s 
effort to build a nuclear weapon, Miklos’ comments also appear relatively 
conciliatory. He acknowledged that members of the committee felt that U.S. 
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policy “should have a coherent policy toward the region which does not conflict 
with the bilateral concerns between the United States and any particular nation.” 
In simpler terms, the subcommittee wanted to know why the United States still 
gave aid to Pakistan despite Pakistan’s continuing efforts to build a nuclear 
weapon. This carefully worded statement went on to emphasize “the very real 
policy dilemma” presented by Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. However, Miklos also 
acknowledged Pakistan’s importance to the U.S. in the region “especially given 
the chaotic situation in Iran and Soviet activities in Afghanistan,” as well as the 
tradition of friendship between the U.S. and Pakistan. Miklos claimed that, not 
only was Pakistan “one of the more moderate states in the Third World…we are 
linked to Pakistan by a 1959 agreement, and the continuing independence and 
territorial integrity of the country is of fundamental importance to us.”125 This 
final statement is interesting considering that it ignores the waxing and waning of 
U.S.-Pakistani relations since 1959 as well as the lack of substantial action taken 
by the United States during the creation of Bangladesh.126 Dubious generalization 
aside, his statement likely reflected a desire, within the State Department and 
elsewhere, to continue aid to Pakistan in light of its growing value in regard to the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Though he acknowledged that Pakistan should 
have been denied further aid for its nuclear enterprise legally, Miklos closed his 
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initial statement hoping “all concerned will keep an open mind on solutions to this 
problem.”127  
The American Embassy in Islamabad 
The testimony of Jack Miklos was perhaps the most important policy 
statement regarding Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is 
quite clear from this testimony that, in the eyes of at least the U.S. State 
Department, Pakistan had become much more valuable to United States. 
However, it is also clear from the Miklos statement that Pakistan presented a 
major policy dilemma to the U.S. as the Pakistani government continued to 
develop its nuclear program. Although the State Department was clearly making 
efforts to justify aid to Pakistan, the relationship between the two countries would 
get far worse before they would be drawn together following the events of 
December 1979. An important policy dilemma that is not evident in Miklos’ 
testimony, but one that, combined with the reduction of U.S. aid, would bring 
Pakistani-American public relations to their nadir, was the growing influence of 
Islamic radicalism both inside and outside Pakistan.  
On November 20, 1979 several hundred armed Shia radicals took control 
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The next day, according to Richard 
Post, the American Consul General in Karachi at the time, the Voice of America 
first broadcast reports of the takeover in Pakistan. It was then reported by the 
BBC and “attributed to the Voice of America.” Following this, Pakistanis 
“immediately got the idea that the Americans are doing this and are taking over 
the Mecca mobs. Having already connived with the Israelis to take over the 
                                                 




mosque in Jerusalem.”128 The U.S. Ambassador at that time claimed that the local 
radio in Islamabad reported that “Americans and Israelis had occupied the Holy 
Places in Mecca…[and] we never could figure out and could not find, in all of the 
reporting, intercepts, and everything else the source of the rumor that swept 
through Pakistan—that it was the American and the Israelis.” As the rumors 
spread “people commandeered buses and trucks” and headed for the U.S. 
Embassy.129  
A significant number were students from nearby Quaid-i-Azam University 
and, according to Hummel, included “a small group of Palestinians who had 
probably been planning some kind of action against our embassy…they arrived at 
the Embassy compound with hoses for siphoning gasoline out of tanks, pails to 
put the gasoline in, and grappling hooks with ropes already attached to them. 
They knew what they were doing.” This view is supported in part by Barrington 
King, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Islamabad at the time, who claimed “the 
Iranians and Palestinians were probably mixed up in this.”130 The Pakistani 
security forces in Islamabad that would normally have been charged with 
dispersing the crowd were concentrated in nearby Rawalpindi protecting General 
Zia as he pedaled the city streets to encourage the use of bicycles. In the four 
hours it took for the Pakistani military to arrive at the Embassy, the mob grew to 
around 2,000 people, two Americans and two Pakistani employees of the 
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Embassy were killed, and the compound was almost completely destroyed. 
Though in the aftermath Hummel described the Pakistanis he encountered as 
“shamefaced…[and] everybody knew that what had been done was wrong,” he 
also claimed “the whole thing was swept under the rug as fast as they could do it, 
they didn’t want a public affirmation of guilt or an apology.” According to 
Thomas Thornton, who worked closely with Brzezinski at the time, relations with 
Pakistan were “about as bad as with any country in the world except perhaps 
Albania or North Korea.”131 In spite of Thornton’s recollection, the next public 
discussion of U.S. policy in South Asia indicated that the situation was not nearly 
so severe.  
Howard Schaffer, the Country Director for India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka at 
the State Department, spoke before the Foreign Policy Conference for Asian-
Americans in New York City on December 1, 1979. Schaffer discussed the 
destruction of the Embassy and the questions surrounding the Pakistani 
government’s slow reaction but he pointed out that “in contrast to the Iranian 
regime, the government of Pakistan acknowledged its responsibility for the 
protection of our diplomatic mission.” Schaffer also addressed the continuing 
problem posed by Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Though he would make 
statements similar to those of Miklos regarding the United States’ pledge “to 
support the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan,” Schaffer claimed 
the U.S. had cut off further economic assistance as well as terminated a “modest 
military training program” because of such ambitions.132 
                                                 





Schaffer’s address is also interesting in that it indicates that the State 
Department at that time viewed South Asia as whole. In language similar to what 
was written about South Asia immediately after WWII, Schaffer declared, “we 
recognize as a fact of life that no matter what measuring stick one uses… India is 
the most important power in the region.” Taken with Brzezinski’s insistence on a 
regional approach to South Asia, Newsom’s repudiation of the purely strategic 
view of the Subcontinent pervasive in the 1950’s and 1960’s, and the efforts of 
the U.S. to prevent an arms race between India and Pakistan, Schaffer’s 
comments suggest that the Carter administration had a great deal in common with 
the early Truman administration in regards to South Asia. This appears to be 
confirmed by Schaffer’s claim that the U.S. “desire to pursue equally good 
relations with all of the countries in the region means that there will be no “tilt” in 
U.S. policy toward any country.”133 
The Invasion of Afghanistan 
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979. 
In a memorandum for President Carter on December 26, Brzezinski indicated the 
initial U.S. reaction to the invasion as well as its impact on Pakistan. The 
President’s national security advisor framed the situation in strategic terms, 
labeling it a “regional crisis,” noting that both Iran and Afghanistan were in 
turmoil and Pakistan was “both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive 
externally.” Brzezinski went on to suggest that “if the Soviets succeed in 
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Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have 
direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.” Apparently, Brzezinski 
was very concerned with this notion of Pakistan’s weakness, claiming that unless 
the U.S. somehow projected “both confidence and power into the region,” 
Pakistan would likely be intimidated and “could eventually even acquiesce to 
some form of external Soviet domination.” Among what he calls preliminary 
thoughts, Brzezinski stated first that it was “essential that Afghanistani [sic] 
resistance” continue which meant “more money as arms shipments to the rebels, 
and some technical advice.” He then declared that “to make the above possible we 
must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels.” Brzezinski 
pointed out that “this will require a review of our arms policy toward Pakistan, 
more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and alas, a decision that our security policy 
toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy.”134 
In addition to considering these issues, the White House was also 
apparently concerned with the implications of the U.S.-Pakistan defense 
arrangement signed in 1959. According to a memorandum from Thomas 
Thornton to Brzezinski, the agreement had been “reaffirmed several times” during 
1979 including in a discussion between Vance and Agha Shai, an advisor to Zia, 
and “implicitly” during a phone conversation between Carter and Zia. Thornton 
also claimed “we have told the Paks that the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is 
within the boundaries of the agreement.”135 Frank Reynolds of ABC News 
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questioned Carter directly on the subject on New Years Eve, 1979, asking, if he 
perceived “that the Soviets are mounting a threat to Pakistan would you commit 
American troops to the defense of Pakistan?” Carter claimed, “We are bound 
by… a long standing agreement, with Pakistan, that if threatened from an outside 
force, for instance the Soviet Union, that we would consult with them and take 
action, including military action if necessary, to protect Pakistan.” When asked 
why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Carter claimed, among other things, “the 
Soviets have long had their eyes on access to the warm waters of the Indian 
Ocean, and of course the two nations that stand in their way now, between 
Afghanistan and those warm waters, are Iran and Pakistan.”136 It appears that this 
traditional explanation of Soviet behavior pervaded U.S. thinking, at least 
publicly, for much of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan despite the fact that 
neither the Soviet Union nor Tsarist Russia had ever expressed interest in ports on 
the Indian Ocean.    
 In addition to reaffirming prior obligations of the U.S., the Carter 
administration also endeavored to enlist the support of China in aiding Pakistan. 
A document labeled “Talking points for HB” instructed the original recipient to 
make clear to the Chinese that “we also see the move into Afghanistan as aimed at 
Chinese prestige in Pakistan and India, as well as U.S. interests in the Gulf.” The 
paper also stated that as the U.S. was unlinking the sale of military equipment to 
Pakistan from the nuclear issue, “it would help if China could provide arms for 
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the Afghan nationalists and for Pakistan also.” 137 On January 3, 1980 Brzezinski 
also addressed the role of China in Afghanistan in a memorandum to Carter. He 
recommended altering the wording in the U.S. arms policy on China from “we 
will not sell arms to China” to “we will not sell offensive arms to China.” 
Brzezinski also reemphasized what he believed were the strategic implications of 
Soviet influence spreading rapidly from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. In 
addition Brzezinski believed that “the recommended subtle change in 
terminology, initiating a limited defense arrangement with China, could be the 
point of departure for a wider security effort in the region.”138  
The very next day in an address to the nation, Carter reiterated a strategic 
view of the Soviet invasion. Carter declared on January 4, 1980, “we must 
recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Soviet 
occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to 
their possible control over much of the world’s oil supplies.”139 In an interview on 
January 7, while discussing efforts to develop an aid package for Pakistan, 
President Carter also expressed his belief in the importance of preparing “for the 
long-range meeting of any threat to peace in the Mideast, Persian Gulf, northern 
Indian Ocean area.” The interviewer responded to this by asking if Carter 
believed the Soviet Union was “really going for the Persian Gulf?” Carter 
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answered that while this was a factor in the situation, “no one can know what the 
Soviets’ plans might be” and it was important to strengthen the “countries in the 
area that might be threatened so that they can repel any potential invasion.”140 
Despite Carter’s public comments, Kux points out that there were clear 
indications that Zia was skeptical of U.S. proposals for military aid.141 The head 
of the CIA, Stansfield Turner, addressed his concerns regarding aid to Pakistan a 
few days later. Turner wrote that “to persuade the Paks that we are sufficiently 
serious for them to cast our lot with us, we will have to give evidence that our 
commitment is to be more than a one-shot affair.” Turner recommended offering 
Pakistan A-7 combat aircraft. Turner also expressed concern that “the Paks and 
many others are anxious to see whether our policies towards the troubled region 
of Southwest Asia show a coherence and a comprehensible purpose.”142  
On January 14, the State Department released the details of a $400 million 
aid package for Pakistan. That same day a lengthy article appeared in the New 
York Times that called the Pakistani military forces “the largest and most 
experienced in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region.” Echoing claims 
made about the Pakistani armed forces in the early 1950’s, the article claimed that 
this large and experienced force was in “urgent need of modern weapons.” 
According to “American intelligence analysts” not only was Pakistan’s 
geographical position “a potential advantage to the West,” “rearmed and 
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modernized, Pakistani forces could balance a Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan to some extent.”143 The next day in an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, Brzezinski addressed the issue of aid for Pakistan but instead of 
emphasizing the potential of the Pakistani military he stressed the administration’s 
willingness to use force to protect its interests in the Middle East and Carter’s 
“firm” and “purposeful” responses to the strategic challenges facing the U.S. He 
also acknowledged that U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions had 
now taken a back seat to the demands of checking Soviet expansion.144 Despite 
this rhetoric, General Zia, in a vastly improved bargaining position following the 
Soviet invasion, famously dismissed the offer as “peanuts.” Claiming “if you took 
Pakistan out of the region you will find that you have not one inch of soil where 
America can have influence– right from Turkey down to Vietnam,” Zia also 
insisted that “Pakistan will not buy its security for $400 million.”145 
            The public battle over aid aside, the CIA’s secret assessment of the 
situation in January 1980 suggested that at the time, the Pakistani government was 
not actively aiding the insurgency in Afghanistan. It was believed that “most of 
the military supplies obtained in Pakistan by the insurgents have been purchased 
from private dealers,” and at best the Islamabad government was unwilling, for 
various reasons, to either aid or hinder the guerillas.146 The assessment also made 
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clear that while “Moscow could decide to take military action on Pakistan’s side 
of the border against the insurgents, or even against the Pakistanis,” this would be 
in the context of fighting an insurgency, not initiating plans to undermine Zia’s 
government. Though a non-response by Zia to Soviet attacks on Pakistani military 
installations would seriously, and perhaps dangerously, damage Zia’s domestic 
credibility, “Moscow would be unlikely to risk such action unless it was confident 
Pakistan could not count on outside help.”147 It appears that a Special National 
Intelligence Estimate on Pakistan confirmed this assessment. In February a 
memorandum for Brzezinski stated “the likelihood of a large scale Soviet military 
intervention at this time in Pakistan is low.” However, this NIE also concluded 
that the decisive factor in Soviet actions inside Pakistan “will be the capabilities 
of opposing forces rather than the nature of the U.S. commitment to Pakistan,” 
and “Moscow will increase its pressures on Pakistan” to end its support for the 
insurgents in Afghanistan.148 
 While rhetoric concerning Pakistani fears and American commitments 
persisted for the remainder of the Carter administration, the U.S. and Pakistan 
failed to reach an agreement on an aid package. A major U.S. policy shift 
concerning Pakistan did not occur.  While the Soviet invasion certainly 
transformed U.S. policy makers’ perceptions of Pakistan, the substantive turning 
point in the relationship came with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in January 
1981.     
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The Reagan Administration 
 As mentioned previously, the ebb and flow of the U.S.-Pakistani 
relationship corresponds quite closely with the changes in the White House. 
Democratic administrations correspond with either deterioration in relations or, in 
the case of Truman and Johnson, benign neglect. Republican administrations saw 
the development of closer U.S.-Pakistani ties and, in the case of Eisenhower, a 
formal agreement for mutual defense. This pattern persisted under Reagan. 
Whereas the Carter administration offered $400 million in aid that, in some cases, 
Pakistani leaders suggested would undermine the security of their country more 
than protect it, the Reagan administration offered Pakistan a $3.2 billion aid 
package in March 1981.  
According to Kux, not only was the Reagan administration much more 
generous financially but it was also more willing to overlook some of the issues 
that had strained relations prior to the Soviet invasion, among them Pakistan’s 
nuclear ambitions and internal political climate. Kux bases this on interviews not 
only with American officials close to the situation but with Pakistanis as well. 
Jane Coon apparently sensed that the Reagan administration “could live with 
Pakistan’s nuclear program as long as Islamabad did not explode a bomb.” On the 
subject of democracy’s absence in Pakistan, Pakistani general K.M. Arif was 
informed by then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, “your internal situation is 
your problem.” 149   
The idea that the Carter administration failed to accommodate Pakistan in 
efforts to confront the Soviet invasion is quite pervasive. Arthur Hummel, who 
                                                 




would serve as Ambassador to Pakistan until July 1981, considered the Carter aid 
package “meager” and a “failure.” Hummel also claims to have brought the 
situation to the attention of Secretary of State Haig and then played “a direct part” 
in changing legislation that enabled the Reagan administration greater freedom in 
aiding Pakistan.150 Richard Post, also in Pakistan under both Carter and Reagan, 
for his part, claimed that “immediately there was a much warmer view towards 
Pakistan.”151 K.M. Arif believes that there was a dramatic change in the U.S. 
attitude “toward our region, the ‘polar bear’ and the evil empire.”152  
However, this portrayal of President Carter may not be entirely accurate. 
Barrington King, whose time in Islamabad straddled both administrations, 
claimed “all the Reagan administration did was just to continue the Carter 
policies… you couldn’t even have told there was a change of administration for 
all the difference it made.”153 As evident earlier, there was a significant effort on 
the part of the Carter administration to eliminate the nuclear issue as an obstacle 
to aiding Pakistan. This may be a case in which the Carter administration’s 
reputation as a foreign policy failure obscures what actually happened.    
Perhaps reflecting the changes in the White House, the State Department 
renewed its attempts to convince members of Congress to waive certain aspects of 
the Foreign Assistance Act. Jane Coon, speaking before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on April 27, 1981 requested that Congress amend “the waiver 
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provision of section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act”154 which would then 
allow Pakistan to receive funding despite its pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
According to Coon, this would “provide the President with needed flexibility and 
permit him to pursue a consistent nonproliferation policy within the context of our 
overall national security interests.”155 The State Department would also send 
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley to Pakistan in 
June to discuss with the Zia regime ways “to assist Pakistan in meeting the 
unprecedented threats to its independence and sovereignty.”156  
In an interesting twist on the subject of Pakistan’s efforts to build nuclear 
weapons, State Department representative James Malone spoke before the Atomic 
Industrial Forum in December. Malone believed that had it not been for the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan the U.S. and Pakistan would have remained 
“fundamentally estranged over the issue.” But the invasion, he contended, brought 
an immediate warming of the relationship and subsequent American assistance. 
According to Malone, not only did this serve U.S. interests in the region and 
greatly improve Pakistan’s security but it apparently also offered “the best 
prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding with the testing or 
acquisition of nuclear explosives.” Malone declared that the Pakistanis had “no 
doubt that such a move on their part would necessarily and fundamentally alter 
the premises of our new security relationship with them.” Malone’s logic is 
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questionable considering that $3.2 billion in aid demonstrated that the U.S. was 
concerned with Pakistan’s security perhaps to such an extent that seriously 
withdrawing aid was not a viable option. 
  In September, Buckley, along with M. Peter McPherson of AID, spoke 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Buckley stressed the importance 
of changing provisions of the Foreign Assistance act but with particular emphasis 
on the strategic value of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Soviets. Buckley’s discussion of 
Pakistan’s strategic importance did not differ markedly from prior discussions and 
if anything is a reflection of the consistency with which U.S. officials portrayed 
Pakistan, emphasizing its location “athwart the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf,” as 
“an essential anchor to the entire Southwest Asian Region,” and in possession of 
“highly professional,” if poorly equipped, armed forces. Alexander Haig would 
make similar comments before the committee in November, insisting that 
“Pakistan…lies between the Soviets and the gulf.”157  
Haig’s statement is interesting for several reasons. In the first place it 
could be considered misleading, as Pakistan was not, geographically speaking, in 
between the U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf. One could also ask: “what exactly did 
U.S. policy makers expect their investment in Pakistan to yield?” Unfortunately, 
most of the policy planning documents that would shed light on this question are 
still classified or remain as yet untapped archival sources. But given what is 
available, it is reasonable to assume at least a few things. First, U.S. policy 
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makers believed Pakistan could serve as a conduit for aid to Afghan insurgents.158 
The U.S. could not arm or supply insurgents in land-locked Afghanistan through 
any contiguous state other than Pakistan, thus making the Pakistani government’s 
sympathy for U.S. aims essential. A second reason the U.S. invested in Pakistan 
was genuine fear for the stability of the country and the region. In a region 
populated by a radical Iran and now chaotic Afghanistan, the government of 
Pakistan had lost half its population a decade earlier, had fought insurgencies in 
Balochistan for several years in the 1970’s, had experienced widespread rioting 
and a military takeover in 1977, and had never achieved control of the North West 
Frontier Province, the nexus of Soviet-Afghan-Pakistani tensions. While a 
severely weakened Pakistan would not irrevocably harm U.S. interests in South 
Asia it was surely worth avoiding if at all possible. By strengthening the Zia 
regime the United States strengthened a military dictatorship whose favor had 
been curried by U.S. arms, but the alternative would have been to risk the further 
deterioration of an already unstable region.   
In addition to these fairly sound reasons, in both the Carter and Reagan 
administrations there were discussions of “historic” Russian ambitions to acquire 
access to the Indian Ocean in addition to notions of Soviet “threats” to the Persian 
Gulf. Richard Post has expressed some skepticism regarding the former 
explanation, suggesting that in particular Brzezinski may have “bought [it], or at 
least wanted people to think [he] bought the warm water port theory.”159  It is 
likely that individuals promoted the idea that the Soviets were pursuing either 
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objective because it was a simple explanation that justified American aid to a 
diverse insurgency in a complicated politico-military situation. It is also possible 
that people promoted this reading of the Soviet Union because they subscribed to 
traditional explanations of Russian history similar to those held by the British and 
Germans in past decades, explanations that were either incoherent to begin with 
or contradicted by events.160    
Any event, by late 1982, Pakistan was scheduled to receive over $600 
million in U.S. aid each year. Only Israel, Egypt, and Turkey received more 
assistance.161 In less than three years Pakistan had moved from the periphery of 
the American strategic vision and a source of diplomatic tension to a place firmly 
at the center of U.S. policy in South Asia and the major means of U.S. influence 





















                                                 
 


























































What Do We Get From Pakistan? 
  
The history of U.S.-Pakistan relations is defined by its ups and downs. The  
United States has, at various points, ignored, lauded, condemned, or courted  
 
Pakistan. At the times when the two countries enjoyed close relations, it was a  
 
result of U.S. thinking concerning the Soviet Union.  
 
In the 1950’s, the U.S. believed that, through a close relationship with 
Pakistan, the U.S. would exert greater influence in the Middle East and South 
Asia and limit the expansion of Communist influence. Part of this effort involved 
the creation of the treaty organizations CENTO and SEATO and the intention that 
Pakistan would play a pivotal role in both. In addition, American policy makers 
also believed that by arming Pakistan, the U.S. would be creating a military force 
that would somehow improve the security of both the Middle East and South 
Asia. However, the policies that fostered such a relationship were based on 
greatly exaggerated notions of Pakistan’s commitment to anti-Communism, its 
potential as a military asset, and the belief that in the event of a global war the 
U.S. would be well served by its investment in Pakistan. As far as CENTO and 
SEATO are concerned, neither organization was particularly influential and 
Pakistan began pursuing closer relations with China in the early 1960’s. It is 
unlikely that Pakistan would have proved to be as valuable a military asset as 





In the 1980’s, the U.S. pursued closer relations with Pakistan in order to 
confront the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Initially in this period, some U.S. 
officials may have sincerely believed that the Soviets intended to move beyond 
Afghanistan, pursuing a port on the Indian Ocean, threatening the Middle East, or 
both. However, some U.S. officials, Richard Post and Ronald Spiers among them, 
claim that they saw the Soviet invasion as an effort to reassert control over 
Afghanistan; failing to do so would have “created major political pressures in the 
Central Asian Soviet Republics,” home to millions of Soviet Muslims.162 This 
school of thought believed that close relations with Pakistan were necessary 
primarily for U.S. to arm Afghan insurgents; essential to making the Soviets pay 
as heavy a price as possible for their Afghan adventure.163 Though this reasoning 
would actually dictate U.S. action much more than the others, the erroneous ideas 
concerning Soviet intentions were never publicly repudiated. 
 So what did the U.S. get from Pakistan? The shortest answer is “Rarely 
what it expected or claimed.” Pakistan’s value to the United States has often been 
misunderstood. In the 1950’s, and to a lesser extent the 1980’s, Pakistan’s 
importance to the U.S. was exaggerated. The Soviet Union never threatened South 
Asia or the Middle East in such a way that Pakistan was an integral part of U.S. 
countermeasures. When Pakistan did serve a critical role in U.S. Cold War plans 
it did so as an intermediary for U.S. arms to Afghan insurgents, not as a rampart 
against Soviet thrusts into South Asia or the Persian Gulf. If ever the Soviets 
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intended either it is unlikely Pakistan would have presented more than token 
resistance.   
In addition to shedding light onto the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations, 
this study also suggests something of the Cold War in general. U.S. officials often 
times expected the Soviet Union to make bold, strategic moves in prelude to a 
broader conflict. At no point did the Soviets act against either the Persian Gulf or 
South Asia in such a manner. In the case of Afghanistan, the Soviets were more 
preoccupied with consolidating control of a peripheral state that could have 
potentially destabilized the Soviet Muslim populations of Central Asia. In 
geostrategic terms, the U.S.S.R. did conform to the expectations or predictions of 
U.S. policy makers. 
The fact that U.S. notions of Pakistan’s strategic value never materialized 
should be seen as a further indictment of geostrategic thinking in general terms. 
However enticing a geostrategic reading of history or contemporary politics may 
be, the fact is that states are far more improvisational and the events that 
necessitate policy shifts are rarely anticipated or predicted. 
This study also reveals something about America’s past and present 
relationships with the Third World. Throughout the waxing and waning of U.S.-
Pakistan relations, one of the constants was Pakistan’s instability. While 
explanations for its weaknesses are quite diverse, some have argued, 
convincingly, that the emphasis placed on Pakistan’s military by the U.S has 
contributed to Pakistan’s problems and actually destabilized Pakistan and South 




both the 1950’s and 1980’s that U.S. aid would stabilize and strengthen Pakistan. 
This, unfortunately, is not an isolated occurrence in U.S. foreign relations. The 
history of these two periods of American-Pakistan relations should be seen as 
further proof that many of America’s Cold War efforts in the Third World failed 
to produce to the stability they promised. This has implications for the present 
period of U.S.-Pakistan relations. For much the 1990’s, Pakistan was once again 
on the periphery of the American strategic vision. This of course changed 
following September 11, 2001. Once again, Pakistan’s proximity and relationship 
to Afghanistan became the subject of considerable U.S. interest. While the 
geostrategic considerations that had shaped U.S. policy in Pakistan during the 
Cold War are no longer present, the close cooperation of the Pakistani 
government and armed forces have become essential to U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. For this new period of relations to be beneficial for both parties, it is 
essential that American and Pakistani policy makers understand the logic that 
underpinned previous eras and avoid making some of the same mistakes. U.S. 
officials, in particular, should recognize that whatever Pakistan’s present 
usefulness, its systemic problems, along with those of South Asia in general, will 
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